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EPIDEMICS, OUTSIDERS, AND LOCAL PROTECTION: 
FEDERALISM THEATER IN THE ERA OF THE SHOTGUN QUARANTINE 
Polly J. Price∗ 
Litigation has begun over restrictive quarantines imposed during the recent Ebola scare. Alleging 
excessive political interference, these lawsuits raise questions about state and local quarantine 
authority. It is widely assumed that states have absolute control over public health threats within 
their boundaries. This article suggests that the presumption of limited federal authority within 
states is overly restrictive and not constitutionally mandated.  
The history of the “shotgun quarantine” during the yellow fever epidemics of the late nineteenth 
century led to protracted debate about the federal government’s ability to preempt or abrogate 
unnecessary, over-reaching quarantines imposed by local governments. The human suffering and 
disruption to commerce caused by the local shotgun quarantine led the South to implore Congress 
for legislation to remedy it – a significant instance in which the post-Civil War South united in 
favor of ceding state’s rights to the federal government. The controversy faded as effective measures 
against yellow fever were found. Because Congress never acted, we have largely forgotten these legal 
debates.  
In recovering that history, this Article offers a new perspective not only on the protection of public 
health in our federal system, but also on state protectionism generally and the exclusion of outside 
threats from local communities. The yellow fever “shotgun quarantine” tested our constitutional 
structure for response to public health emergencies, and found it wanting 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 370 
I. YELLOW FEVER AND THE SHOTGUN QUARANTINE ................. 373 
A. Epidemics in the South, 1878–1905 ................................ 374 
B. The Best Defense: Quarantine? ....................................... 376 
C. The Mechanics of the Shotgun Quarantine ....................... 379 
II. GOVERNING DISEASE BY MARTIAL LAW .................................. 382 
A. State and Local Quarantine Authority ............................. 383 
B. The Refugee Problem ...................................................... 386 
C. Commercial Disruption, Rivalry, and Rumor.................... 391 
D. Regional Solutions? ....................................................... 394 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law and Professor of Global Health, Emory University School of Law.  I am 
grateful for the opportunity to workshop earlier drafts at the University of Southern 
California, Vanderbilt, and St. Louis University law schools, and also to the following for 
their comments and suggestions: Al Brophy, Mary Dudziak, Deborah Dinner, James Ely, 
Martha Fineman, Robert Gatter, Robert Parrish, Edward Shoemaker, and Sasha Volokh. 
370 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:2 
 
1.  Mobile Convention, 1898 .......................................... 395 
2.  Memphis Convention, 1898 ...................................... 396 
3.  Chattanooga Convention, 1905 ................................. 397 
III. LAW IN THE TIME OF QUARANTINE: DEBATING FEDERAL 
AUTHORITY ............................................................................ 398 
A. The U.S. Supreme Court, Quarantine, and Interstate 
Commerce .................................................................... 399 
B. 1878–1893: First Reactions to the Shotgun Quarantine ..... 402 
C. The 1897 Epidemic: Toward a National Quarantine Law . 405 
1.  Public and Private Advocacy ..................................... 407 
2.  Deficiency of Existing Law: Hearings Before Congress ... 408 
D. The 1905 Epidemic: A Narrow Defeat for Federal 
Intervention ................................................................. 413 
IV. MODERN ECHOES: FROM QUARANTINE TO SYRIAN 
REFUGEES ............................................................................... 419 
A. Federal Quarantine Authority Today ............................... 420 
B. Ebola Controversies, and a Preview of the Zika Virus? ........ 422 
C. Syrian Refugees, Toxic Waste, and Other Perceived Threats 
to Local Communities .................................................... 425 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 427 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There can be no question as to the suffering in the State of Mississippi.  
Half the towns and cities have quarantined themselves against the living 
world. . . . Around villages are cordons of armed men, ready to shoot 
down the first invader.  Traffic has been extinguished.  Hundreds if not 
thousands of laborers have been thrown out of employment. . . . How 
much longer will the Southern States continue in this madness?1 
 
In September 1897, Oscar Wilson attempted to return to his home in 
Meridian, Mississippi.  He had traveled to Nashville, Tennessee, to consult a 
physician about a bone tumor in his shin.  But a “shotgun quarantine” 
interrupted his return rail journey near the Mississippi state line.  Oscar was 
compelled to leave the train at Livingston, Alabama, and, as his money ran 
out, he had to walk some thirty-five miles to his home, where his leg was 
 
 1 Fruits of Local Quarantine, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1898, at 6. 
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amputated.  Like countless others caught up in the epidemic, Oscar had no 
symptoms of yellow fever, nor had he traveled from any area where yellow 
fever was present.  No matter; with threat of force, Mississippi had 
quarantined itself against the world.2 
From the 1870s through the first decade of the twentieth century, local 
governments throughout the South defended their towns against epidemic 
disease by imposing a form of quarantine by martial law, popularly known as 
the “shotgun quarantine.”  Facing the annual terror of yellow fever, armed 
men guarded their towns to prevent the entry of persons from anywhere 
yellow fever might be present. 
Shotgun quarantines halted trains, devastated commerce, and imposed 
misery for thousands of refugees.  State governments attempted to end local 
shotgun quarantines but could not do so.  As state legislative efforts to 
control local shotgun quarantines failed, southern politicians and business 
leaders turned to Congress for federal aid. 
For nearly four decades, the shotgun quarantine set the terms of debate 
over the constitutional authority of the national government to manage 
epidemics.  Congress explored whether the federal government had the 
authority to override state and local quarantines in order to prevent the 
wider harm these actions imposed on the region.  Could the national 
government veto quarantines authorized by lower levels of government and 
which were viewed to be unnecessary? 
Fast-forward to the present.  Litigation has begun over quarantines 
imposed by state governments during the recent Ebola scare.3  Four state 
governors imposed far stricter quarantines within their states than the CDC 
and medical experts recommended, leading to charges of excessive political 
grandstanding in the face of unreasonable public fear.4  Although relatively 
few persons experienced these restrictive quarantines, the episode has set 
precedent for future public health emergencies.  State and local public 
health measures, when unnecessary and fueled by local politics, could cause 
disproportionate harm on a much wider scale. 
This was the problem posed by the shotgun quarantine in the South.  
The public response to the nineteenth-century shotgun quarantine provides 
 
 2 See Wilson v. Ala. G.S.R. Co., 28 So. 567 (Miss. 1900) (differentiating between an 
ostensibly reasonable quarantine and the overzealous quarantine actually in place). 
 3 See Sheri Fink, Connecticut Faces Lawsuit over Ebola Quarantines, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2016, at 
A20; Justin Wm. Moyer, Kaci Hickox, Rebel Ebola Nurse Loathed by Conservatives, Sues Chris 
Christie over Quarantine, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www. washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2015/10/23/kaci-hickox-rebel -ebola-nurse-loathed-by-conservati
ves-sues-chris-christie-over-quarantine/; see also ACLU and Yale Global Health Justice 
Partnership, Fear, Politics, and Ebola: How Quarantines Hurt the Fight Against Ebola and Violate 
the Constitution (Dec. 2015), https://www.aclu.org/report/fear-politics-and-ebola. 
 4   See infra Part IV.B. 
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a window into developments in constitutional federalism, municipal and 
state government relationships, the police power of the state, and martial 
law.  The legislative debates exploring the boundaries of state and federal 
authority centered around and reacted to the shotgun quarantine, but the 
underlying principles at issue echo far more broadly.  At least three U.S. 
Presidents and many members of Congress believed the federal government 
had the authority to override a state-imposed quarantine.5  But federal 
legislative efforts to control the shotgun quarantine failed, and the question 
has never been tested in court. 
The federal government’s quarantine authority remains ambiguous 
today.  The modern federal government in the United States has interstate 
quarantine authority by statute,6 but what does that really mean?  Prior 
accounts have not considered the yellow fever scares of the late nineteenth 
century as a key development in public health federalism.  Furthermore, 
scholars have been insufficiently attentive to the fact that states and 
municipalities could legally prevent the movement of commerce and large 
numbers of people.  Whether the federal government could remedy the 
situation occupied Congress for nearly three decades. 
There are some surprising results.  A contemporary noted that the South 
“had been impelled by the ravages of the yellow scourge to forget their 
extremes State’s rights theories and become champions of placing in the 
hands of the federal government far greater powers than it had hitherto 
exercised for the purpose of protecting the public health.”7  When southern 
states did ask for federal intervention, it was because they could not control 
independent-minded local governments even within their own states, let 
alone trust other states to control theirs. 
While the days of the shotgun quarantine are in the distant past, the 
threat of widespread epidemics is not.  Congress came close to authorizing a 
federal override of any state or local inland quarantine,8 and the debates 
about this possibility teach much about how the participants understood 
constitutional structure (the Commerce Clause in particular), and the 
powers of state and local political institutions and agencies.  In the end, 
however, no legislature—state or federal—was able to lay the shotgun 
quarantine to rest.  Instead, the controversy faded as effective measures 
against yellow fever were found.  But this history is of relevance in modern 
 
 5  See infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 6 See Legal Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (Aug. 2015), 
http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html 
(summarizing legal definitions and authorities for federally-enacted quarantines). 
 7 Edwin Maxey, Federal Quarantine Laws, 43 AM. L. REV. 382, 388–89 (1909). 
 8 See infra Parts III.C, III.D. 
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public health emergencies.  The protection of public health has not been 
viewed consistently as subject to the federal government’s powers under the 
Commerce Clause, particularly the “dormant” variety. 
Currently, the common view is that the federal government may 
interfere with a state’s or municipality’s choice to impose population-based 
quarantine restrictions only when a state asks for assistance, or when it fails 
to act to prevent an epidemic crossing state lines.9  I suggest this belief is a 
misunderstanding derived from inaction in the past.  Federal authority here 
is inherent and is not structurally limited by the U.S. Constitution, and 
indeed is supported by, among others, a constitutional “right to travel” and 
the Dormant Commerce Cause.  There should be a federal role to preempt 
or override unnecessary state and local geographic quarantines.  The need 
for regulatory standards and clear federal authority remains, 
notwithstanding the distant era of the shotgun quarantine.  In recovering 
that history, this Article offers a new perspective not only on the protection 
of public health in our federal system, but also on state protectionism and 
the exclusion of outside threats from local communities. 
I. YELLOW FEVER AND THE SHOTGUN QUARANTINE 
City is barricaded against city, town against town, and village against 
village . . . the channels of commerce are dammed, and the entire 
country in which the barbarous embargo is operated is given over to 
chaos, hardship, and frenzied fear. 
These assumptions of dictatorship over everything terrestial [sic] by every 
little community . . . against all the people on earth who reside outside 
their community limits, have been carried to ruinous lengths.10 
 
Yellow fever is an acute disease with a high mortality rate.11  It is marked 
by a rapid onset of symptoms—bleeding from the mouth, nose, and copious 
 
 9 Indeed, recent scholarship emphasizes the inability of states, acting alone, to effectively 
respond to a major epidemic without federal assistance and coordination.  See, e.g., John 
Thomas Clarkson, Phase Six Pandemic: A Call to Re-Evaluate Federal Quarantine Authority 
Before the Next Catastrophic Outbreak, 44 GA. L. REV. 803, 807–13 (2010) (describing the 
ability of the federal government to respond to a public health emergency); Wendy E. 
Parmet, After September 11: Rethinking Public Health Federalism, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 201 
(2002) (exploring the Commerce Clause and police power of states).  Such authority is 
already provided by statute if a state fails, or is unable, to take effective measures against 
interstate spread of disease.  This proposition is not really controversial as a constitutional 
matter.  Instead, this Article examines what can be considered the opposite problem: a 
state or local government engages in protectionism (economic or political) beyond the 
necessity to do so, disrupting commerce and the movement of persons, among other 
harms to national interest. 
 10 The Foolish Shotgun Quarantine, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1897, at 6. 
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amounts of “black vomit,” with delirium from high fever and jaundice 
turning the skin yellow prior to death.12  Yellow fever is not endemic to the 
United States but can be imported from areas where it is.  Both Ebola and 
yellow fever are subject to federal quarantine for persons entering the 
United States.13  The International Health Regulations place special 
significance on vaccination against yellow fever.14 
As is well-documented by historians, yellow fever periodically wreaked 
havoc in the South over many decades, especially during the post-Civil War 
period through the early twentieth century.15  The disease had an especially 
high mortality rate and proved able to evade ship quarantine and 
disinfection measures.16 
A. Epidemics in the South, 1878–1905 
The South notoriously had the worst health in the nation throughout 
the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth.17  Poverty and 
geography played a primary role.  Hookworm, pellagra, and malaria were 
among the health problems retarding economic growth, such that FDR in 
 
 11 See JOHN R. PIERCE & JIM WRITER, YELLOW JACK: HOW YELLOW FEVER RAVAGED AMERICA 
AND WALTER REED DISCOVERED ITS DEADLY SECRETS 1, 7 (2005). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See 42 C.F.R. § 71 (2012) (providing for the prevention of “the introduction, 
transmission, and spread of communicable disease from foreign countries”, as well as 
designating yellow fever vaccination centers); Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 
17,255 (Apr. 9, 2003), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,375, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,299 (Apr. 5, 
2005) (extending coverage to potentially pandemic-causing influenza viruses); Legal 
Authorities for Isolation and Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Aug. 
2015), http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/aboutlawsregulationsquarantineisolation.html 
(summarizing legal definitions and authorities for federally enacted quarantines). 
 14 See International Health Regulations, WORLD HEALTH ORG., International Certificate of 
Vaccination or Prophylaxis (2005), http://www.who.int/ihr/ports_airports/icvp/en. 
 15 See generally KHALED J. BLOOM, THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY’S GREAT YELLOW FEVER EPIDEMIC 
OF 1878 (1993); JO ANN CARRIGAN, THE SAFFRON SCOURGE: A HISTORY OF YELLOW FEVER 
IN LOUISIANA, 1796–1905 (1994); MOLLY CALDWELL CROSBY, THE AMERICAN PLAGUE: THE 
UNTOLD STORY OF YELLOW FEVER, THE EPIDEMIC THAT SHAPED OUR HISTORY (2006); JOHN 
DUFFY, SWORD OF PESTILENCE: THE NEW ORLEANS YELLOW FEVER EPIDEMIC OF 1853 
(1966); JOHN H. ELLIS, YELLOW FEVER AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE NEW SOUTH (1992); 
DEANNE STEPHENS NUWER, PLAGUE AMONG THE MAGNOLIAS: THE 1878 YELLOW FEVER 
EPIDEMIC IN MISSISSIPPI (2009); PIERCE & WRITER, supra note 11; MARGARET HUMPHREYS, 
YELLOW FEVER AND THE SOUTH (1992). 
 16 BLOOM, supra note 15, at 30–32; George Sternberg, Yellow Fever and Quarantine, Public 
Health Papers and Reports, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, at 351–57 (1880), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2272542/. 
 17 James O. Breeden, Disease as a Factor in Southern Distinctiveness, in DISEASE AND 
DISTINCTIVENESS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 8–10, 12–13 (Todd L. Savitt & James Harvey 
Young eds., 1988) (specifying certain phenomena and diseases as being particularly 
precipitous in causing the South to lag far behind the rest of the country as a result of the 
lack of health safety throughout the region). 
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1938 famously labeled the South “the nation’s No. 1 economic problem.”18  
But even though malaria and other diseases caused more deaths in the 
southern region, yellow fever was more terrifying, causing widespread panic 
wherever it appeared. 
Following the American Revolution, points to the north were hit hard by 
yellow fever (particularly Philadelphia in 1793), but by the mid-nineteenth 
century yellow fever had become primarily a southern phenomenon.19  For 
over fifty years in the era following the Civil War, annual visitations of yellow 
fever in the South were predictable.  Starting in late spring, people feared 
yellow fever’s appearance through the end of the “season,” generally the first 
frost.20  The Texas governor, for example, issued annual proclamations 
authorizing quarantine when and where yellow fever appeared, effective 
April 1 of each year.21 
Why did yellow fever subside in the North after 1800?  Although seaports 
along the North Atlantic coast employed stringent port quarantine measures 
throughout the nineteenth century, the shift of yellow fever to southern 
regions did not necessarily reflect a superiority of quarantine method.  
Instead, the nature of commerce had changed.  Mercantile traffic from the 
Caribbean – yellow fever points of origin – shifted markedly to southern 
rather than northern ports.22 
Major epidemics originating in southern port cities occurred in 1878, 
1897, and 1905.  The 1878 epidemic alone is estimated to have stricken 
120,000 people, resulting in at least 20,000 deaths in the region and “a 
pecuniary loss of not less than 100 million dollars.”23  The entire Mississippi 
River Valley from St. Louis south was affected.  Tens of thousands fled the 
stricken cities of New Orleans, Vicksburg, and Memphis.24  Similarly, the 
1897 outbreak affected nine states and caused cities and towns throughout 
the region to impose shotgun quarantines.25  The 1905 epidemic was 
 
 18 Louis Stark, South Is Declared ‘No. 1’ by President in Economic Need, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1938, 
at 1.  Letter from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Members of the Conference on 
Economic Conditions in the South (July 5, 1938), in NATIONAL EMERGENCY COUNCIL, 
REPORT ON ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE SOUTH, 1–2 (1938) (requesting a report from 
the various government agencies on what the President describes as “the Nation’s 
problem”). 
 19 See K. David Patterson, Yellow Fever Epidemics and Mortality in the United States, 1693–1905, 
34 SOC. SCI. & MED. 855, 856 (1992). 
 20 See Waiting for Frost, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1879, at 1; NUWER, supra note 15, at 19. 
 21 Judgments Must Be Paid, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 23, 1901, at 3. 
 22  Round Table Discussion on Yellow Fever, PBS: AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (Sept. 29, 2006) 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/fever/sfeature/experts.html (explaining that the 
“main factor in yellow fever’s spread in the nineteenth century [had] to do with shipping 
and commerce from the tropics”). 
 23 See PIERCE & WRITER, supra note 11, at 69; see also Maxey, supra note 7, at 387–88. 
 24 See HUMPHREYS, supra note 15, at 137–38. 
 25 Id. 
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America’s last major outbreak, for reasons that are not entirely clear.26  All 
told, in the nineteenth century yellow fever is believed to have killed 100,000 
Americans, with three-quarters of the deaths occurring after 1805.27  Given 
unreliable data, one historian has suggested the total “could well be 150,000 
or more.”28 
Yellow fever was such a prominent annual risk that life insurance 
companies included a standard clause voiding the policy if the insured 
traveled below a “yellow fever line,” a geographic demarcation that included 
the entire southern region—Washington, D.C., to St. Louis, Missouri, to El 
Paso, Texas.29  Policy-holders who died of yellow fever forfeited any claim 
unless they had previously paid an additional amount for a “southern 
waiver” for yellow fever.30 
Anyone who previously survived yellow fever was believed to be immune, 
as were African-Americans as a group, and those who had lived for some 
time in yellow fever-prone areas were said to be “acclimated.”31  Nonetheless, 
those who could do so left southern coastal areas every summer to avoid 
yellow fever.  They returned when cooler weather set in; experience taught 
that outbreaks subsided soon after the first frost.  As one November headline 
alerted readers: “No More Quarantine; All the Cities Have Called it off This 
Year.”32 
B. The Best Defense: Quarantine? 
The transmission of yellow fever by mosquitoes would not be understood 
until the turn of the twentieth century.33  The southern climate, combined 
 
 26 See Patterson, supra note 19 (speculating that various changes in technology contributed 
to the decline). 
 27 Id. at 859. 
 28 Id. 
 29 See BLOOM, supra note 15, at 29. 
 30 See, e.g., Bennecke v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 105 U.S. 355 (1881).  In that case, the 
insured died of yellow fever in New Orleans during the 1878 epidemic.  He had not 
previously applied for a twenty dollar southern waiver of the life insurance geographic 
limits.  His brother-in-law attempted to do so when news of the epidemic came out, but 
the insured was already dead by the time the twenty dollars was paid.  The Court held that 
the waiver was invalid and, to add insult to injury, the insurance claim was denied.  See also 
Globe Mut. Life Ins. v. Wolff, 95 U.S. 326 (1877) (voiding policy for violation of 
geographic limit and explaining that allowing the claim would sanction “fraud” by the 
policyholder). 
 31 Jo Ann Carrigan, Impact of Epidemic Yellow Fever on Life in Louisiana, 4 LA. HIST. 5, 6 (1963). 
 32 No More Quarantine, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 8, 1899, at 2 (reporting the widespread 
termination of quarantines). 
 33 The United States Yellow Fever Commission published results establishing the mosquito 
as vector in 1900.  See MICHAEL B.A. OLDSTONE, VIRUSES, PLAGUES, AND HISTORY 65 
(1998) (documenting the discovery of the mosquito as a vector at the start of the 
twentieth century). 
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with ubiquitous stagnant bodies of water, provided fertile areas for mosquito 
reproduction.  Mosquitoes could not survive year-round except in the 
Florida Keys, so the annual introduction of yellow fever into the South came 
by way of coastal shipping from Cuba and other points in the Caribbean.34 
Coastal areas proved unable to prevent the introduction of yellow fever 
by strict maritime quarantine.  As a result, the population’s best defense was 
to flee from or avoid travel to coastal areas during the summer months.  
Those who remained risked being prevented from escape—trapped by 
inland towns that thought they could achieve with the shotgun what the 
maritime quarantine could not. 
Residents of towns beyond coastal areas believed spread of the disease 
could only be stopped by prohibiting travelers and infected cargo from 
entering their towns.  The prevailing view in the South was that yellow fever 
spread from person to person and by contact with infected objects.35  This 
was partially right—mosquitoes, having a short flight range, required the 
presence of a yellow fever sufferer in order to infect others.  In addition, 
cargo could harbor mosquitoes, and railroads could speed them throughout 
the South.36  Hence, the appearance (or rumor) of a single case of yellow 
fever anywhere set in motion defensive quarantine measures in townships 
throughout the South. 
In the nineteenth century, the standard legal definition for quarantine 
stated: 
[Q]uarantine is the existence of a line or cordon around an infected 
territory, or part of such a territory, beyond which limits no person (and, 
according to some rules, no goods) may pass until sufficient time may 
have elapsed to permit proper officers to ascertain whether the persons 
so desiring to pass from the infected district be, or be not, infected with 
the disease.37 
A barrier or policy prohibiting travelers from entering or leaving an area was 
also known as a cordon sanitaire.38  Then, as now, the governmental power to 
 
 34 See HUMPHREYS, supra note 15, at 124. 
 35 See NUWER, supra note 15, at 15–16. 
 36 R. Scott Huffard Jr., Infected Rails: Yellow Fever and Southern Railroads, 79 J. S. HIST. 79, 84 
(2013) (explaining how railroads and train passengers contributed to the spread of 
yellow fever). 
 37 Sherston Baker, Quarantine and Its Reform, 254 L. MAG. & REV. 72, 72–73 (Nov. 1884) 
(defining quarantine as a practice in relation to the yellow fever epidemic).  The modern 
use of the term “quarantine” distinguishes “isolation”: “Isolation separates sick people 
with a contagious disease from people who are not sick.  Quarantine separates and 
restricts the movement of people who were exposed to a contagious disease to see if they 
become sick.” CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Quarantine and Isolation (last 
updated Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine (describing the distinction 
between the terms “isolation” and “quarantine”). 
 38  Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Using a Tactic Unseen in a Century, Countries Cordon Off Ebola-Racked 
Areas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2014, at A10. 
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quarantine authorized the use of physical force against individuals and 
groups.39 
The medical profession hotly disputed the cause of yellow fever, and 
even whether it was contagious, until the discovery of the mosquito vector in 
1902 became generally accepted.40  Before that time, there were two 
competing theories about how people acquired yellow fever.  Medical 
professionals could not agree on the best method to eliminate the threat of 
yellow fever, and they also were starkly divided about the necessity of 
preventing travel from infected areas.41  If yellow fever could be spread by 
persons and contaminated objects, which was certainly the popularly-held 
view, then strict quarantine of travelers and cargo seemed the best defense. 
A rival theory argued that yellow fever was a result of poor sanitation.42  
Yellow fever seemed limited to cities and towns.  As one historian noted, 
“The miasma of cities, resulting from dead animals, the by-products of 
slaughtering and rendering establishments, and piles of unremoved human 
excrement, seemed distinctively capable of breeding yellow fever.”43  Under 
such conditions, it was believed, yellow fever could arise spontaneously, 
without introduction from another area.44  Better sanitation, burning, and 
fumigation were the best defenses, while quarantine of travelers was 
useless.45 
Holders of the sanitation theory were often distinctly unsympathetic to 
the South.  In the year following the devastating 1878 epidemic, one 
northern journalist wrote about sanitation problems in Memphis: 
With all the warning that was given by the fever then, nothing has since 
been done in the way of drainage or purification.  The fact is, Memphis is 
one of the filthiest towns in all the South. . . . The worst feature of the 
 
 39 Modern quarantine authority in the United States permits the use of physical force by law 
enforcement officers at the request of designated public health officials.  The threat of 
physical force through arrest is usually sufficient to encourage compliance with a 
quarantine or isolation order, as experience with tuberculosis control measures has 
shown.  See Polly J. Price, Tuberculosis Control Laws in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region: Legal 
Framework in the United States, 5–7 (Emory Univ. Sch. of L., Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, 
Paper No. 15-371, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2709829 (detailing American 
quarantine and isolation policies and practices). 
 40 J. M. Lindsley, Quarantine Regulations Should Be Based Against Yellow Fever upon the Doctrine 
that It Is Only Conveyed by the Mosquito, 29 PUB. HEALTH PAPERS & REP. 81 (1903), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2222399/. 
 41 BLOOM, supra note 15, at 11–22. 
 42 Id.; see also HUMPHREYS, supra note 15, at 7. 
 43 HUMPHREYS, supra note 15, at 19 (describing the unhygienic living conditions in urban 
areas, which was believed to have exacerbated the spread of yellow fever). 
 44 BLOOM, supra note 15, at 13. 
 45 Id. at 38, 112–13; HUMPHREYS, supra note 15, at 53, 151.  
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sorrow is that the native inhabitants have no ambition to remove the 
cause . . . .46 
Fumigation became a common practice for ships and railroad cars; a few 
towns undertook what was termed a “general fumigation” by burning 
disinfectants in the streets.47  Disconcertingly, one health officer reported: 
“The first two days succeeding a general fumigation, the fumigating crews 
invariably had trouble with the people who had ‘fumigated themselves’ a day 
or two before.”48 
C. The Mechanics of the Shotgun Quarantine 
The first use of “shotgun quarantine” in the popular press occurred after 
the devastating 1878 outbreak.  A writer for The Chicago Daily Tribune 
employed the phrase in an article about his recent travels in the South: 
We asked a dweller in one of these villages if the yellow fever would come 
again with Midsummer.  “No, sir,” he answered: “not if shotguns can 
keep it out of this town.” 
It is most natural for Southern whites to resort to the shotgun in all their 
troubles.  They have adopted the theory that yellow fever is spread solely 
by contact. . . . They therefore propose to prevent all intercourse between 
neighborhoods,—to station patrols, armed with shotguns, on all their 
highways, and to entirely prevent all traveling. 
. . . . 
It may be that the strictest SHOTGUN QUARANTINE will prove 
ineffectual against its advance.  It is doubtful, however, if the Southern 
white will ever comprehend this contingency.49 
Whether this writer coined the phrase or heard it elsewhere, soon thereafter 
other newspapers discussed the “shotgun quarantine,” and it quickly became 
the customary terminology used to label any locality’s declaration of a 
quarantine against entry from points infected, or rumored to be infected, 
with yellow fever.50   
 
 
 46 Margaret Warner, Local Control Versus National Interest: The Debate over Southern Public 
Health, 1878–1884, 50 J.S. HIST. 407, 421 (1984) (quoting Boston’s Commonwealth, July 26, 
1879). 
 47 Yellow Fever Spreads in Small Parishes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1905, at 3. 
 48 U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BUREAU OF PUB. HEALTH AND MARINE-HOSP. SERV., Doc. NO. 2456, 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SURGEON-GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND MARINE-
HOSPITAL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1906, at 155 (1907) 
(describing an adverse effect of fumigation). 
 49 Way Down South, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 8, 1879, at 9 (depicting what likely was the first use 
of the term “shotgun quarantine”). 
 50 For example, a search of ProQuest Historical Databases (thirteen leading newspapers) 
between 1878 and 1910 returns more than 250 articles using the term “shotgun 
quarantine.” 

















Headline, The Hennessee (Okla.) Clipper, September 7, 1905 
The earliest use of the term “shotgun quarantine” in the Washington Post 
appeared in 1879 in a headline from Memphis, described as follows: 
The quarantine fever has, however, struck Arkansas with more force than 
ever.  The Sheriff of Crittenden, just across the river, has ordered the 
arrest and imprisonment of all Memphians caught in the act of crossing.  
The whole riverfront is closely watched by armed police.51 
A sampling of headlines from the New York Times,52 The Chicago Daily 
Tribune,53 The Washington Post,54 and other newspapers highlight the shotgun 
quarantine and the problems it caused: 
“Shotguns Keep All Trains on the Move”55 
“The Shotgun in Alabama: A Quarantine That Evidently Means 
Business”56 
“Fight on Quarantine: Louisiana May Use Troops to Lift Local 
Embargoes . . . Many Towns Without Medicines and Short of Food”57 
 
 51 Yellow Fever: Still Spreading in Memphis—The Shotgun Quarantine, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 
1879, at 1 (employing the first known use of the term “shotgun quarantine” in one of the 
nation’s premier publications). 
 52 See generally A Shotgun Quarantine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1886, at 1; Shotgun Quarantine on 
Mississippi Border to Bar Out Animals Exposed to Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1924, at 13. 
 53 “Shotgun” Quarantine—Panic in the Yellow-Fever Districts Worse Than the Disease, CHI. DAILY 
TRIB., Aug. 16, 1888, at 5; A Shotgun Quarantine, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1888, at 2. 
 54 Shotgun Quarantine, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1898, at 4; Shotgun Quarantine Denounced, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 7, 1897, at 1; Under Shotgun Quarantine, WASH. POST, May 21, 1899, at 3; A 
Shotgun Quarantine Against Biloxi, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1886, at 1. 
 55 Shotguns Keep All Trains on the Move, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 13, 1897, at 2. 
 56 The Shotgun in Alabama: A Quarantine That Evidently Means Business, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 
27, 1888, at 2. 
 57 Fight on Quarantine, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1905, at 1. 
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“All Have Shotgun Quarantine”58 
What constituted a “shotgun quarantine?”  The salient features derive 
from contemporary reports.  The shotgun quarantine was characterized by 
two key concepts: 
• A geographic boundary: The declaration of a “cordon sanitaire” that 
prohibited a population from entering or leaving an area.  The 
geographic barrier applied to all persons, whether sick or well, and if not 
sick, without regard to whether they were likely to become so.  Trains 
attempting to pass through the cordon would either be stopped before 
entering, or not permitted to discharge passengers or cargo.59 
• Armed, deputized deterrence: Enforcement of the cordon by local or state 
government authority, to prevent or deter entry by anything or anybody.  
Rarely were shotgun quarantines the work of vigilantes.  Although the 
term suggests mob rule, shotgun quarantines came at the behest of 
mayors, town councils, and other political bodies.  Formal declarations 
gave official imprimatur to enlist citizens or militias to aid sheriffs in 
guarding the line or in preventing trains from stopping there.60 
Shotgun quarantines were usually declared “against” other towns or 
areas where yellow fever was believed to be present.  For example, the 
Washington Post reported: 
The quarantine against portions of Harrison County, Miss., has been 
removed.  The citizens of Pass Christian have established a strict shotgun 
quarantine against Biloxi, armed guards being placed at all avenues of 
ingress from that town and vigilance will be maintained day and night.61 
In another example, the Indianapolis Journal reported in 1888: “Special 
telegrams from Grenada, Corinth and other Mississippi towns report 
shotgun quarantine having been established against Decatur, Ala., Jackson, 
Miss., and other infected points.”62 
Shotgun quarantines could be put in place quickly, relying on deputized 
volunteers where militias or law enforcement officers were lacking.  In one 
episode, as the Washington Post described, 
It is probable that there was never a more rigid quarantine established 
than that with which Meridian, Miss., sought to protect herself from the 
invasion of the yellow fever.  As soon as the fever appeared in Mississippi, 
quarantine was declared against the infected place, and when the fever 
 
 58 All Have Shotgun Quarantine, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 23, 1888, at 13. 
 59  See sources cited infra notes 61–64. 
 60 See, e.g., A Big Scare in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1897, at 1 (noting, in the sub-heading, 
“Talk of Reorganizing the Shotgun Quarantine Force”). 
 61 A Shotgun Quarantine Against Biloxi, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1886, at 1 (chronicling an 
instance when one county declared a shotgun quarantine against all residents of another 
town). 
 62 Fever Panic in the South, INDIANAPOLIS J., Sept. 22, 1888, at 2 (chronicling an instance when 
a municipality declared a shotgun quarantine against several cities). 
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began to spread the city shut herself up tight, placing a military guard in 
the outskirts and forbidding any person to come across the line.  The 
railroads also were forbidden to discharge passengers there . . . .”63 
The most frequent press reports of shotgun quarantines occurred during 
the three big epidemics of 1878, 1897, and 1905.  Even when armed men 
were not present, the term “shotgun quarantine” (and, occasionally, 
“shotgun brigade”64) became shorthand for preventing trains from stopping 
or discharging passengers, and for refusing entry to persons traveling from 
other areas.65 
In addition, local authorities might quarantine persons inside a cordon 
to prevent their escape.  In one incident, a sheriff in Columbia, South 
Carolina, arrested a judge who stepped outside “a ring of special policemen” 
surrounding the hotel where he was staying, where authorities suspected a 
resident had contracted smallpox.66  The town marshal was fined five dollars 
“for letting a prisoner escape.”67 
As related in more detail below, railroads—and their passengers and 
cargo—bore the brunt of shotgun quarantines throughout the region. 
II. GOVERNING DISEASE BY MARTIAL LAW 
Pestilence, like war, disrupts society, and silences the law.68 
 
Although the shotgun quarantine was a distinctly regional phenomenon, 
its origin was embedded in the local government law of each state.  Efforts to 
rein in the chaotic shotgun quarantine required greater centralization of 
state authority.  But quarantine was a significant way in which local 
governments unilaterally could impede interstate commerce, and states 
found themselves unable to rein them in. 
 
 63 A Southern View of the Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1898, at 6 (chronicling an instance when 
a city prohibited railroads from discharging passengers within its borders); see also 
Columbus Bars Montgomery: There is a Shotgun Quarantine Maintained at Some Points, ATLANTA 
CONST., Oct. 19, 1897, at 2. 
 64 James H. McCall, The Quarantine Laws and National Control of Quarantine, 72 MED. NEWS 
483, 484 (1898) (“One county in Western Tennessee went so far as to station a shotgun 
brigade on the county line for the purpose of preventing any trains from passing through 
the county.”). 
 65 Litigation for commercial loss following yellow fever epidemics is an interesting story in 
itself, the subject of a subsequent article.  For example, railroads were sued, 
unsuccessfully, by banana shippers whose cargo spoiled en route due to local quarantines.  
See, e.g., Ala. & V.R. Co. v. Tirelli Bros., 93 Miss. 797, 962–63 (1909) (holding that a 
railroad carrier was excused for refusing to complete a shipment of bananas due to a 
force it was unable to control: a local quarantine of bananas). 
 66 Sheriff Arrests a Judge, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 21, 1901, at 3. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Sims v. State, 72 Tenn. 357, 360 (1880). 
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A. State and Local Quarantine Authority 
The right of a state or local government to impose a quarantine existed 
from the time of independence, based upon pre-existing colonial norms.69  
In most states this authority was made explicit by legislation granting the 
power to declare quarantines to the governor as well as to counties and 
municipalities.70  Under these statutes, local shotgun quarantines were 
legitimate exercises of political power.  Local governments scrupulously 
noted the legality of their actions, bristling at the equation of the shotgun 
quarantine with mob rule.71  In reality, it was likely difficult to distinguish 
measured decision-making from the political persuasion of the mob to 
compel town governments to act. 
Georgia provides a good example.  From statehood, the Georgia 
Assembly recognized that control of contagious disease was a responsibility 
of local government.72  The 1793 Quarantine Act, at more than 2000 words, 
was one of the most significant and detailed early legislative acts, and its 
purpose was to prevent the introduction of “plague, smallpox, malignant 
fever, or any other contagious distemper.”73  Subsequent amendments to the 
1793 Act show attempts to clarify which authorities were in charge of 
quarantine matters, and the extent of their power. 
In the 1793 Act, much of which concerned maritime quarantine, local 
justices of the peace and customs officers were authorized to impose fines 
on maritime vessels alleged to have violated the terms of the Act, with courts 
 
 69 See William Hamilton Cowles, State Quarantine Laws and the Federal Constitution, 25 AM. L. 
REV. 45, 67–69 (1891) (explaining debates in the first Congress and the original terms of 
federal presence at seaports). 
 70  See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Biodefense and Constitutional Constraints, 4 U. Miami Nat'l Sec. 
& Armed Conflict L. Rev. 82, 99 (2014) (discussing an early Massachusetts quarantine 
law).  See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824) (citing “quarantine laws” as an 
example of “that immense mass of legislation . . . which can be most advantageously 
exercised by the States themselves”); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 400 (1849) (citing 
quarantine laws as an example of the states’ legitimate exercise of the power of “self-
preservation,” or the power to “guard against the introduction of any thing which may . . . 
endanger the health or lives of their citizens”). 
 71 See Have Lost Their Heads: Parts of the South Under Mob Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1888, at 1 
(characterizing certain local legislative acts as mob rule). 
 72 See, e.g., Act of Dec. 17, 1793, No. 485, para. IX, reprinted in A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF GEORGIA 514, 517 (Robert Watkins & George Watkins eds., Philadelphia, R. 
Aitken 1800) [hereinafter 1793 QUARANTINE ACT] (authorizing “justices of the county or 
commissioners of the town” next to inlets and rivers to appoint “centinels” and “guard-
boats” to enforce quarantine).  This division of state and local government is consistent 
with the findings of William Novak, who has provided other examples of local authority 
deriving from limited state capacity.  See William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal 
Origins of State Power in America, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061, 1078–79 (1994) (describing the 
New York State legislation that granted to the city of Albany “ample powers to pass 
regulations of their own”). 
 73 1793 QUARANTINE ACT, supra note 72, at 516. 
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enforcing the fines.74  Practical limitations on the availability and number of 
justices of the peace led the Legislature to provide for whistleblowers—any 
person could collect part of the fine imposed on a ship captain or owner 
who had failed to report sickness or maintain a quarantine.75  Failure to 
report sickness of crew or passengers, or failure to answer truthfully, meant a 
fine of £100.76 
For persons entering the state by land or traveling inland from a port, 
the governor of the state had the power by proclamation to appoint 
“centinels” who in turn had authority to turn away or compel the return of 
anyone suspected of carrying a contagious disease.  Should a sentinel fail in 
this duty, he was subject to the same fine levied on a person who disobeyed 
or fled a quarantine order.77 
While the governor possessed executive authority to proclaim a 
quarantine anywhere in the state, towns and counties had the same authority 
within their jurisdictions and were expected to use it.78  The city of Savannah 
had its own quarantine power, described in separate provisions of the 1793 
Act, reflecting its preeminence in population and the commerce of its port 
as well as the frequency of its own yellow fever episodes.79  Decisions 
respecting quarantine were invested in the “Corporation of Savannah,” and 
mention is made of a “health officer” for the port.80  Like county justices and 
town commissioners, the Corporation of Savannah could “use all and every 
means in their power to enforce this law for the purposes intended.”81  
Justices of the peace could impose fines or seek jail time by petitioning a 
local court.82 
Over the next century, various amendments and permutations of the 
Quarantine Act characterize legislative attention to quarantine.  These 
changes share two characteristics: (1) local elected officials had unilateral 
power to determine the need for a quarantine, its duration, and whether the 
 
 74 Id. at 515. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 516. 
 78 1793 QUARANTINE ACT, supra note 72, at 517.  Justices of the county or commissioners of 
any town were “fully authorized to fix such centinels [sic], guard-boats and to use all and 
every means in their power to enforce this law for the purposes intended.”  Id. 
 79 Id. at 516–17.  “Negroes” were automatically quarantined for ten days on land following 
the arrival of the ship.  Id.  This provision was noted to be “obsolete” in a compilation 
published in 1822, as slave importation had been outlawed after 1808.  A DIGEST OF THE 
LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 191 (Oliver H. Prince ed., Milledgeville, Grantland & 
Orme 1822), http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/ga_code/6.  Free persons of color 
arriving in the city were subject to other administrative burdens, but those were not 
especially disease-control measures. 
 80 1793 QUARANTINE ACT, supra note 72, at 516–17. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 515. 
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local quarantine order had been violated; and (2) judicial involvement was 
limited to enforcing penalties—either a fine or jail time, at the discretion of 
the elected official.  This basic structure remained the same as 
improvements in interstate travel (especially by rail) increased the likelihood 
of contagious disease introduced from other states. 
As the number of counties and townships grew, so did the number of 
independent political subdivisions with independent quarantine power.  
Today, each Georgia county retains quarantine authority,83 meaning a 
“legal” quarantine, with or without shotguns, is possible in any one of 
Georgia’s 159 counties. 
The Supreme Court recognized a seemingly unlimited local police 
power for quarantine as early as Gibbons v. Ogden84 and again in 1900, noting 
that “from an early day the power of the States to enact and enforce 
quarantine laws for the safety and the protection of the health of their 
inhabitants . . . is beyond question.”85 
As we shall see, in light of the massive disruption to travel and commerce 
occasioned by the shotgun quarantine, it is striking that the Dormant 
Commerce Clause did not play any role in legal debate at the time.  The 
shotgun quarantine would seem an easy target for federal preemption.86  
The same is true for the later development of a “right to travel” protected by 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, a concept closely related to the 
Dormant Commerce Clause.87  Neither of these constitutional doctrines 
made any appearance in the debates over state and local quarantine. 
Why are these constitutional ideas absent from debate?  One answer may 
be the transient nature of the quarantines and the inability of any court to 
 
 83 GA. CODE ANN. § 31-12-4 (2016) (“The department [of health] may . . . require 
quarantine or surveillance of carriers of disease and persons exposed to, or suspected of 
being infected with, infectious disease until they are found to be free of the infectious 
agent or disease in question.”). 
 84 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824) (describing how inspection laws “form a portion of that immense 
mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State not 
surrendered to the General Government; all which can be most advantageously exercised 
by the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every 
description . . . are component parts of this mass”). 
 85 Compagnie Francaise De Navigation A Vapeur v. La. Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 387 
(1902). 
 86 For a general background on the historical development of the “Dormant Commerce 
Clause” doctrine, see Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause 
and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569 (1987); Donald H. Regan, 
The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 
MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986). 
 87 For historical background on the “right to travel” as a constitutional interest, see Bryan H. 
Wildenthal, State Parochialism, the Right to Travel, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (1989); see also Kathryn E. Wilhelm, Freedom of Movement at 
a Standstill? Toward the Establishment of a Fundamental Right to Intrastate Travel, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 2461 (2010). 
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intervene in a timely fashion.  But the dominant reason is that immediate 
health risks were categorically different from commerce and other 
constitutional relations between states.  By the early 1900s the Supreme 
Court had recognized as much in the Quarantine Cases, concerning a state’s 
right to prevent entry of cattle from another state.88 
In the same period, the Supreme Court also recognized a sweeping local 
government power (indeed, a responsibility) in times of health emergencies.  
Jacobson v. Massachusetts89 upheld the prosecution of a person who refused to 
be vaccinated during a smallpox outbreak.  In doing so, the Court stated 
that “[u]pon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a 
community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease 
which threatens the safety of its members.”90  This privilege for local 
protectionism trumped the myriad difficulties posed by the shotgun 
quarantine, as described below.  What separates us today from the 
constitutional status of the shotgun quarantine is the due process revolution 
of the twentieth century, not the Commerce Clause. 
B. The Refugee Problem 
A gentleman from this city tried to get to Faunsdale, south Alabama, to 
see his wife, who was visiting there.  He was escorted out of three towns 
by armed guards, after being compelled to leave a quarantine train thirty 
miles from his destination. . . . He was finally compelled to walk twenty 
miles under guard to the station, where he could get a train back to this 
city.91 
 
At the first appearance of yellow fever, untold numbers attempted to flee 
the region, especially from the South’s commercial cities.  In 1878 in 
Memphis, for example, more than half of the city’s population of 47,000 left 
to escape the disease, most to more northerly regions.92  In some years the 
flood of refugees was so great that relief camps were established for those 
denied passage.93 
 
 88 Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902) (validating state statute protecting cattle from risk 
of disease by cattle from another state). 
 89 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 90 Id. at 27. 
 91 The Shotgun in Alabama, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 27, 1888, at 2. 
 92 See Benjamin Evans, The Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1878 and Public Health Reform in Memphis, 
15 RHODES HIST. REV. 1, 11 (2013). 
 93 See, e.g., United States Marine-Hospital Service, Annual Report of the Supervising Sur-
geon-General of the Marine-Hospital Service of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1898 
(1899) (discussing detention camps for the prevention of yellow fever).  As a relief 
measure, the federal government established detention camps at several points to receive 
travelers turned-away by quarantines.  Those detained were provided with a certificate 
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News headlines, once again, illustrated the refugee problem: 
“Cities Along the Way Closed, Passengers Not Allowed to Alight 
Anywhere Short of Alabama Line”94 
“Railroads Stop All Their Trains”95 
“Terrified South Ties Up Traffic”96 
“Atlanta and the Refugees”97 
“No Quarter in the South: Frightened People Are Refused a Refuge: 
Some Communities Are Terror-Stricken by the Report that Fever is 
within a Hundred Miles”98 
Some cities north of the coast, including Atlanta and Nashville, invited 
refugees to come, provided they could get through shotgun quarantines 
along the way.99  Travelers at times could board special “refugee trains” to 
these sanctuaries.100 
The American Medical Association condemned the shotgun quarantine 
because of “its brutality of administration in so many places.”101 
With all its rigors and entailed human suffering, the shotgun quarantine 
always fails of its object to arrest every incomer.  There is ever a 
loophole—a careless or avaricious or potatious guard, or a byway that 
escapes watch.  The traveler of the better class, going openly, can not 
miss detention or deportation, but the criminal and the tramp, and at 
times the local celebrity of powerful connections, can always find an open 
door.  Town after town in the infected area is demonstrating these 
truths.102 
To the extent travelers received some kind of individual inspection, they 
had two possible ways to pass through a shotgun quarantine.  One was to 
prove, somehow, that they had not traveled from or been present in any area 
where yellow fever was thought to exist.103  Another was to demonstrate 
 
upon discharge, to prove length of time away from a yellow-fever zone.  For further 
discussion of federal action, see Part IV infra. 
 94 P.J. Moran, Greenville and the Yellow Fever, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 16, 1897, at 3. 
 95 Railroads Stop All Their Trains, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 19, 1897, at 6. 
 96 Terrified South Ties Up Traffic, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 29, 1905, at 3. 
 97 Atlanta and the Refugees, ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 19, 1888, at 12. 
 98 No Quarter in the South, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1888, at 1. 
 99 See Nashville Invites Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1905, at 2; see also Atlanta and the Refugees, 
ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 19, 1888, at 12 (“Atlanta is the only city in the gulf and south 
Atlantic states that has not refused to shelter the yellow fever refugees from Florida.”). 
100 See Decatur, Alabama, Lifts Quarantine, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 3, 1897, at 9 (describing 
refugee trains); Georgia Towns Ask Protection, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 22, 1899, at 24. 
101 Yellow Fever, 45 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 722, 722–23 (Sept. 2, 1905). 
102 Id. 
103  See, e.g., Wilson v. Ala. G.S.R. Co., 28 So. 567 (Miss. 1900) (noting one state’s regulation, 
which prohibited certain people from infected areas from exiting trains at state’s train 
stations, and providing exceptions for certain people from non-infected areas merely 
passing through the state); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Roane, 46 So. 711, 711–12 (Miss. 
1908) (noting that, in the midst of the yellow fever epidemic in Mississippi and Louisiana, 
most Southern states required passengers to show health certificates). 
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immunity from yellow fever by having had the disease in the past.104  Some 
residents obtained or forged a physician’s note to this effect.105 
Later in the nineteenth century, state boards of health sought to 
standardize the process by issuing “official” immunity cards in an effort to 
aid the state’s citizens.  An example follows: 
Florida State Board of Health “Yellow Fever Immunity Card,” 1899. 
 
104  But see Wendy E. Parmet, From Slaughter-House to Lochner: The Rise and Fall of the 
Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40 Am. J. Legal Hist. 476, 493 n.131 (1996) (noting 
that Louisiana’s ordinance went a step further, permitting its Board of Health to block 
the entry of individuals whether “unacclimated” or “acclimated” to yellow fever). 
105 See infra note 106 and accompanying text.  African Americans, though as a general rule 
subject to discrimination in travel and accommodation, seem to have been treated more 
equally to their white counterparts who were subject to a shotgun quarantine.  African 
Americans were perceived to have immunity from yellow fever, based on their African 
ancestry, and were sometimes even allowed to travel on special “excursion trains” through 
yellow fever zones.  See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BUREAU OF PUB. HEALTH AND MARINE-HOSP. 
SERV., supra note 48, at 148–49 (noting that a majority of excursionists from Vicksburg 
during an outbreak of yellow fever were of African descent and that “[i]t is a well-known 
fact” yellow fever was milder among people of African descent). 
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Florida State Board of Health “Yellow Fever Immunity Card,” 1899. 
 
The “Yellow Fever Immunity Card” pictured above ostensibly permitted 
travel on railroads and other conveyances or on foot through quarantined 
areas.  Note that proof of immunity was based on the individual’s having 
“experienced an attack of yellow fever,” followed by the location and year.  
Receipt of the card depended upon the credibility of the individual and the 
cooperation of a physician.  Scams abounded, including “contemptible petty 
robbery of the ignorant” by way of certificate and notarial fees; dozens of 
card holders were turned back because of fraudulent papers.106 
Possession of a health certificate did not guarantee the cooperation of 
local health inspectors, however.  In one particularly sad case, two brothers 
returning home from tuberculosis treatment in the West purchased tickets 
from Memphis to Oxford, Mississippi, but were required to change trains at 
Holly Springs, Mississippi.107  The brothers boarded the train at Memphis, 
but during the trip they were approached by a man who claimed to be a 
quarantine officer of the city of Holly Springs and were told to get off the 
train.  Even though the boys possessed certificates showing that they had not 
been in any yellow fever-infected region, they were forced to leave the train 
at a rural station, leaving the boys to make their way back to Memphis on 
foot.  Two days later, they traveled by another route to Oxford.  One brother 
 
106 U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BUREAU OF PUB. HEALTH AND MARINE-HOSP. SERV., supra note 48, at 
182. 
107  St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Roane, 46 So. 711, 711–12 (Miss. 1908). 
390 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 19:2 
 
died from tuberculosis two days after arriving at Oxford.  His brother lived 
only a few weeks more, both deaths allegedly hastened by the ordeal.108 
Railroads did not assume responsibility for passengers reaching the 
destination for which they had purchased a ticket.109  Moreover, in this time 
period, passengers had only a nascent constitutional “right to travel,”110 and 
certainly no judicially enforceable right to pass through a quarantine 
imposed under the authority of the state’s police power.  Any “right to 
travel” was not likely enforceable in any meaningful way, as described below. 
Travelers had no effective remedy through the judicial system.  Courts 
were unable to intervene—sometimes years passed before tort or contract 
suits wound their way through trial and appeal.  Even if they could petition a 
court for an injunction or writ of mandamus, judges deferred to medical 
opinion on the necessity of quarantine and were unwilling to referee 
disputes about it.111 
Tort and contract remedies, moreover, were limited.  Judges preferred 
not to revisit governmental choices during an epidemic.  One of the few 
successful claims grew out of the 1897 epidemic.  In Wilson v. Alabama G. S. 
R. Co.,112 the railroad was held liable for damages in forcing a passenger to 
disembark at the Mississippi state line on account of a quarantine by the 
Mississippi State Board of Health.  But in that case, no Mississippi health 
officers were actually present to compel obedience to the quarantine.  The 
 
108 Id. 
109 See The Railroads in Epidemics, ATLANTA CONST., April 1, 1898, at 11; R. Scott Huffard, Jr., 
Infected Rails: Yellow Fever and Southern Railroads, 79 J.S. HIST. 79, 80 (2013) (describing the 
adjustment of residents to the development of railroads in the South as “anything but 
smooth”). 
110 In 1867, the Supreme Court ruled that the right of travel throughout the United States 
was a right, privilege, or immunity of national citizenship.  This right could not be 
interfered with by a state seeking to impose a capitation tax upon all travelers.  Crandall v. 
Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 49 (1867).  For subsequent developments regarding the constitutional 
right to enter and reside in any U.S. state, see Kevin Maher, Like A Phoenix from the Ashes: 
Saenz v. Roe, the Right to Travel, and the Resurrection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 105, 106–07 (2001) (discussing how the right 
to travel was, ostensibly, protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as recognized in the Slaughterhouse Cases); see also Jason Alloy, 
Note, “158-County Banishment” in Georgia: Constitutional Implications under the State 
Constitution and the Federal Right to Travel, 36 GA. L. REV. 1083 (2002) (discussing Georgia’s 
practice of banishment as a punishment for crimes).  Interestingly, no federal 
constitutional arguments appear to have been made in the case of a Maine nurse who 
sued the state’s health department over the terms of her quarantine order.  See Order 
Pending Hearing, Mayhew v. Hickox, No. 2014-36 (D. Me., Oct. 31, 2014) (noting that no 
mention of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
made in the Plaintiff’s argument in her suit against the state’s quarantine). 
111 Tort and contract decisions as well as extra-legal norms occasioned by the various yellow 
fever epidemics in the South are beyond the immediate scope of this Article.  A full 
treatment of this subject will be the subject of a separate article. 
112 Wilson v. Ala. G.S.R. Co., 28 So. 567 (Miss. 1900). 
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railroad company acted, it said, because it had been given prior notice of the 
order.  Absent compulsion by health authorities, the railroad was held liable 
for wrongful discharge and the resulting damage suffered by the 
passenger.113 
As the Mississippi Supreme Court explained: 
The public health must be vigilantly cared for, but with due caution that 
no order intended to secure it shall be so sweeping and arbitrary as to 
interfere unreasonably with the citizen’s rights of return to his home, 
neither he nor it having been exposed to infection.  With every 
disposition to uphold all reasonable regulations of our efficient and 
faithful board of health, we are constrained by the oft-settled doctrines 
applicable to declare this order void for unreasonableness.  Doubtless 
this order would not have been given its unconfined sweep, but for the 
hurry and excitement of the times.114 
But obedience to a quarantine order when enforcement was not 
imminent was a risk the railroad assumed: 
The railroad company must take the risk—as all citizens do—as to the 
validity of such orders, when it yields to the order alone.  And when its 
defense is, not that it yielded obedience because only of the order, but 
because, also, of vis major,—a shotgun quarantine, for example,—its 
defense will be maintained, if it shall appear that such vis major, such 
uncontrollable necessity, was the real cause of its action.  It need not go 
to the extent of actual collision with force marshaled by necessity; but it 
must show that its action was due to such force, existing and capable of 
controlling its action.115 
The railroad had acted solely on the authority of an order later deemed 
“void” and thus was liable to its passenger.  But the prevailing judicial 
attitude did not question a local government’s right to impose any 
quarantine it saw fit, frequently citing the maxim, salus populi suprema lex—
“the health of the people should be the supreme law.”116 
If passengers were not generally considered to be engaged in interstate 
commerce, cargo and mail shipments clearly were.  The significant effect of 
the shotgun quarantine on business interests is surveyed below. 
C. Commercial Disruption, Rivalry, and Rumor 
The disruption to commerce resulting from the shotgun quarantine, 
more than the plight of refugees, provoked business leaders and the 
politicians they lobbied to pursue legislative solutions. 
 
113 Id. at 569. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 567–69. 
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Beyond doubt, the North was aware of the commercial impact 
occasioned by the shotgun quarantine in the South, as is evident from news 
articles in the Washington Post, the Chicago Daily Tribune, and the New York 
Times.  As some headlines alerted readers: 
More Fever Cases: Situation Not Regarded as Unusually Alarming.  Heavy 
Blow to Business: Texas and Mississippi Quarantines Especially Severe.117 
Yellow Fever Epidemic . . . . Business Much Depressed118 
All Trade Stagnant119 
The Wall Street Journal reported local quarantines as they were imposed 
in the South, further evidence of the attention to commercial disruption 
caused by the shotgun quarantine.120 
Unsurprisingly, local business interests outside the afflicted areas backed 
efforts to prevent shotgun quarantines.  At various points, chambers of 
commerce, hoteliers, railroad officials, and the League of American 
Municipalities lobbied state legislatures and Congress for relief.121  “Railroad 
men” were especially concerned, with representatives of the various rail lines 
joining state and regional conferences on quarantine.122 
These same groups also had an incentive to suppress reports of yellow 
fever in their cities, for fear of interference with commerce that would result 
from shotgun quarantines imposed against them.  Accordingly, health 
officials accused each other of bowing to political pressure by failing to 
report legitimate cases of yellow fever.123  One of the most prominent 
disputes arose in the vicinity of Biloxi, Mississippi.124  Health officials from 
New Orleans and Mobile insisted Biloxi physicians were covering up cases of 
yellow fever, while Biloxi health officials, in turn, accused them of inciting 
an quarantine without adequate justification: 
The people of Biloxi held a mass meeting to-day [sic] and passed 
resolutions expressing their confidence in the medical intelligence and 
 
117 More Fever Cases, WASH. POST, July 30, 1905, at 1. 
118 Yellow Fever Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1897, at 5. 
119 All Trade Stagnant, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1897, at 2. 
120 See, e.g., Yellow Fever Conditions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 1897, at 2; Effect of Yellow Fever, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 2, 1898, at 4; The Yellow Fever Situation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1905, at 2. 
121 See, e.g., Unify Quarantine Throughout Land: Atlanta Chamber of Commerce Secures Unanimous 
Action, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 17, 1897, at 1; see also State Quarantine Ineffectual, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 14, 1900, at 1 (recounting the urging of Dr. Brunner of the League of 
American Municipalities for national quarantine laws). 
122 For a Uniform Quarantine Law, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 30, 1898, at 17; Yellow Jack Convention 
Meets and Adopts Code for the South, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 17, 1898, at 5; see also Many 
Officials Will Be Present, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 23, 1905, at 3. 
123 Quarantine in the Gulf States, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1884, at 5 (“The meeting had hardly got 
to work before Dr. Jerome Cochrane, of Mobile, accused the helath officers of Louisiana 
and Florida of withholding information about yellow fever cases from the Alabama 
authorities.”). 
124 A Shotgun Quarantine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1886, at 1. 
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experience of their local physicians, who had declared the cases of 
sickness to be bilous [sic] remittent fever, denouncing the report of the 
visiting officials of New-Orleans [sic] and Mobile, which has done the 
town an irreparable injury in driving away hundreds of visitors, stopping 
trade, and depriving hundreds of working people of their daily bread.125 
By the same turn, city officials often accused business interests in other 
locations of spreading false rumors for commercial gain.126  The degree of 
panic, however, probably led to rumors regardless of motive.  As one 
headline described, for example, “Rome Will Not Quarantine: Rumor that a 
Case Was Found Caused a Panic Almost.”127  The Atlanta Constitution blamed 
journalists for much of the “insane yellow fever panic,” describing how 
correspondents “in every little hamlet” sent news reports “from every little 
cross-roads town in the south.”128 
The most public accusation of a politically-motivated economic embargo 
involved the states of Louisiana and Texas.129  Texas sealed its borders with 
Louisiana following reports of yellow fever in New Orleans.  In a lawsuit 
brought before the U.S. Supreme Court, Louisiana officials claimed the 
strict quarantine was unnecessary and was designed to benefit the port of 
Galveston and other cities in Texas at the expense of the commerce of New 
Orleans.130  The Court declined to hear the case on the ground that it did 
not have original jurisdiction.131 
Another quarrel between the governors of Mississippi and Louisiana over 
quarantine jurisdiction seems certain to have been about underlying 
commercial interests.  According to a writer for the Chicago Daily Tribune: 
Gov. Vardaman of Mississippi equipped a flotilla and, as Gov. Blanchard 
of Louisiana afterward complained, invaded the waters of the latter state, 
driving out the fishermen, seizing vast oyster fields, etc., occupying 
 
125 Id. 
126 See A Shotgun Quarantine, N.Y. TIMES., Sept. 3, 1886, at 1 (“The people of Biloxi held a 
mass meeting to-day . . . denouncing the report of the visiting officials of New-Orleans 
and Mobile, which has done the town an irreparable injury in driving away hundreds of 
visitors, stopping trade, [etc.] . . . .”); No Yellow Fever at Biloxi, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1886, at 
5 (“The Biloxi yellow fever sensation has fizzled out. . . . [B]ut Cadet point, where the 
cases of sickness occurred, is quarantined . . . not because the recent diseases were 
infectious, but for the comfort and solace of other cities.”).  The most serious and public 
accusations arose between Louisiana and Texas during the epidemic of 1905.  See Part 
IV.A infra. 
127 Rome Will Not Quarantine: Rumor That a Case Was Found Caused a Panic Almost, ATLANTA 
CONST., Sept. 21, 1897, at 1. 
128 A Senseless Scare Abating, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 27, 1888, at 4. 
129 See Louisiana Against Texas Treatment, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 16, 1899, at 1. 
130 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 8 (1900).  This case is examined in Part IV.A infra. 
131 Id. at 23. 
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Louisiana territory, and generally committing unwarranted and 
intolerable depredations.132 
An opinion in the Atlanta Constitution favored a national quarantine law 
precisely to counter such economic embargoes: 
The one remedy for such manifestations is a national quarantine law 
broad enough in its provisions to meet every emergency. . . . We should 
hear no more of shotgun quarantines, and there would be no basis for 
irritation or ill feeling between states, or between communities in 
different states.133 
Business losses in each major epidemic were difficult to estimate.  During 
a given fever season, a time-lapse geographic map of locally-imposed 
shotgun quarantines would show hundreds of towns lighting up as sickness 
spread.134  The effect would be like a disco strobe light.  Under such 
circumstances it was difficult for people to plan even ordinary commercial 
transactions, with the result that many businesses, large and small, closed 
their doors permanently.135 
The yellow fever epidemics of the latter part of the nineteenth century 
created pressure to restructure the balance between state and local police 
power.  The shotgun quarantine proved that state governments had limited 
legal authority over independently-minded local communities.  As a result, 
state legislatures undertook to centralize control over quarantine authority.  
These measures would fail to achieve their purpose, leading to the 
conclusion that only the federal government could provide an effective 
solution. 
D. Regional Solutions? 
Similar disputes took place throughout the South, as governors and 
legislatures attempted to quell the local shotgun quarantine.  The failure of 
these efforts led southern health officials to attempt region-wide responses 
to yellow fever epidemics.  Ultimately, the attempt to attain uniform regional 
standards would fail, leading southern politicians to ask for federal 
intervention. 
 
132 Richard Weightman, Edible Enlightenment in South’s Quarantine War, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 
14, 1905, at 8. 
133 Wanted: A National Quarantine Law, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 17, 1899, at 6. 
134 For example, The Atlanta Constitution reported, “Brunswick’s city council held a called 
meeting tonight and passed a resolution authorizing Mayor Atkinson to quarantine 
against any places he believed to have yellow fever and at any time he deemed proper.”  
Brunswick Ready for Quarantine, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 12, 1899, at 1. 
135 Appalling Affliction, DAILY AM., Sept. 6, 1878 at 1 (describing the “gloomy” effect of having 
“all the business houses except two drug stores” closed in Brownsville, Tennessee); In a 
Panic!, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 16, 1897, at 1 (“The state capital [of Mississippi] 
depopulated, its business houses closed, its newspapers suspended . . . .”). 
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Following the far-reaching epidemics of 1897 and 1905, delegates from 
southern states attended regional conferences aimed at a coordinated 
response to yellow fever. 
1.  Mobile Convention, 1898   
At the request of Governor Johnston of Alabama, representatives of 
southern states met in Mobile to plan a quarantine convention of the South 
Atlantic and Gulf states.  Representation was to be “fixed at five members, 
appointed by the governor of each state, one delegate from each 
municipality and one from each commercial organization, railroad system 
and river transportation company, [and] all chiefs of quarantine service in 
the states . . . .”136  The program, the invitation stated, would cover “the 
whole subject of quarantine in relation to state and national government . . . 
.”137  In anticipation of the convention, the organizing committee adopted a 
resolution “appealing to [C]ongress to withhold action on the public health 
and quarantine matters until the subject can receive the attention its 
importance demands.”138 
The convention assembled in February 1898 in Mobile, and included a 
broad spectrum of southern society: “members of the medical profession, 
members of the legal fraternity, members of the cloth; the laity being 
represented by men from great corporations—the railroads, boards of trade 
and commerce, and cities interested in the vital interests to be discussed.”139 
Optimism at the outset of the convention was great: 
The high importance of the quarantine convention now in session here 
was today established for the first time and tonight it may safely be 
predicted that the result of their deliberation will go much further 
toward shaping future quarantine legislation of national, state and local 
character than the most sanguine of its promoters hoped for.140 
It was also clear to the delegates that their action could have national 
importance.  As an observer reported, “The fact that [C]ongress will 
recognize the final action of the convention has been telegraphed here in 
many different ways from Washington, and it is even apparent that 
Washington is trying to influence some of the delegates.”141 
 
136 Quarantine Laws Debated in Mobile, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 19, 1897, at 21. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Hearing Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the H.R. on Bills (H.R. 4363 and 
S. 2680) to Amend an Act Entitled “An Act Granting Additional Quarantine Powers and Imposing 
Additional Duties upon the Marine Hospital Service”, 55th Cong. 20 (1898) [hereinafter 1898 
Quarantine Powers Hearing] (statement of H.B. Horlbeck, Health Officer, Charleston, 
S.C.). 
140 Quarantine Laws Are Discussed, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 11, 1898, at 1. 
141 Id. 
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The final result of the convention reflected divided opinion on many 
questions, but at the end delegates strongly favored national legislation of 
some sort.  The Atlanta Constitution trumpeted the headline “Home 
Quarantine Loses the Fight: Mobile Convention Declares in Favor of 
National System,” though it noted, “Details Not Yet Perfected.”142  Those 
details, in fact, would be a matter of some dispute at a congressional hearing 
later that spring.143 
2.  Memphis Convention, 1898   
A self-styled “National Quarantine Convention” took place in Memphis 
ten months later.  At the invitation of Memphis merchants to “all 
interested,” the convention delegates included “many prominent scientists,” 
representatives from the Marine Service Hospital, and state and local health 
boards.144  Of the 125 delegates, most were from southern states.145 
At the outset of the convention, the delegates received a telegraph 
communicating the views of President William McKinley: 
The [P]resident has received your communication inclosing [sic] a copy 
of the resolutions recently adopted by the Memphis merchants’ 
exchange, in accordance with which a convention has been called to 
meet in your city . . . . It affords me pleasure to assure you of the 
[P]resident’s deep interest in this and other movements looking to the 
prevention of the unhealthful and distressing condition referred to, and 
to convey his best wishes for a most successful result of the deliberations 
of the convention.146 
The Memphis group passed resolutions stating the need for national 
control of quarantine, but they were unable to agree as a group with respect 
to the specific legislation needed.  Senator George Vest of Missouri, who was 
unable to attend, wrote to the delegates that he did not believe that “any 
legislation can be had doing away with the present complex and conflicting 
conditions as to quarantine.”147  The primary impediment, according to 
Senator Vest, was state boards of health.  They “are determined to retain 
their jurisdiction as it now exists, and this is absolutely inconsistent with the 
idea of such a national quarantine as will secure rapid and efficient 
opposition to yellow fever.”148 
 
142 Home Quarantine Loses the Fight, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 12, 1898, at 1. 
143 1898 Quarantine Powers Hearing, supra note 139, at 20–23, 29–30, 54, 86. 
144 Quarantine Folk Will Meet Today, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 16, 1898, at 2. 
145 Quarantine Convention Holds Three Sessions and Organizes, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 18, 1898, 
at 1. 
146 Id. 
147 Quarantine Folk Will Meet Today, supra note 144. 
148 Id. 
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3.  Chattanooga Convention, 1905   
The most ambitious regional conference took place in Chattanooga in 
November 1905, just as the epidemic of 1905 wound down.  Nine governors, 
two senators and eighteen congressmen from southern states attended the 
“Southern Quarantine and Immigration Congress,” which sought regional 
authority for interstate quarantine control together with their state boards of 
health.149 
In the opening address, Governor John Cox of Tennessee reportedly 
said the Convention should “provide for uniform quarantine legislation by 
the Southern States, which should have the approval of the National 
Congress and thus have the force of constitutional law, so that a citizen 
going to any part of the South in times of epidemic should know exactly 
what conditions he would meet.”150 
Over some objection on grounds of states’ rights—including by 
Governor Vardaman of Mississippi, who warned the convention “against 
taking any steps which will trample upon the autonomy of our States”151—the 
delegates attained remarkable unanimity on the need for congressional 














Atlanta Constitution, November 11, 1905 
Unable to agree on an effective regional approach, delegates to the 
convention concluded that Congress alone could solve the problems posed 
by the shotgun quarantine.  They hoped Congress would approve a 
“national quarantine” law that would, in the words of the Atlanta Constitution, 
“wipe[] out the state line foolishness with its inevitable display of opera 
 
149 Governors Disagree, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1905, at 11. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
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bouffe officialism in the contingency of a dangerous epidemic, placing the 
responsibility for quarantining and the care of the pestilence victims upon 
the broad shoulders of Uncle Sam.”152  At least some delegates, however, 
believed the convention’s resolution would not remove any power of 
municipal quarantine.153 
Congress took note of these three regional conventions when it 
considered the extent of the federal government’s authority to preempt 
state and local quarantine. 
III. LAW IN THE TIME OF QUARANTINE: DEBATING FEDERAL 
AUTHORITY 
If the gentleman will read all the decisions, and then undertake to write 
down in words exactly where the national power ends and where the 
State power begins on this subject of quarantine he will accomplish what 
in my judgment nobody else has yet accomplished.154 
 
As we have seen, the shotgun quarantine made its first widespread 
appearance during the 1878 epidemic.  The shotgun quarantine also 
featured prominently in the epidemics of 1897 and 1905, followed in each 
instance by congressional efforts to address it.  Proposed legislation would 
have provided the federal government with explicit power to single out any 
local quarantine and dismantle it.  At no other time has such an extension of 
federal quarantine power been considered or more fully vetted. 
Two sessions of Congress—in 1898 and 1906—tackled head-on the 
question whether the federal government could force a municipality to end 
its shotgun quarantine.  These sessions featured intense advocacy for 
Congress to assume the power to override the local shotgun quarantine, 
invitations which Congress ultimately declined.  This Part examines these 
legislative moments for a clearer view of the constitutional issues at stake. 
 
152 The National Quarantine Law, ATLANTA CONST., April 7, 1906, at 8. 
153 As the Atlanta Constitution summarized: 
The exercise by the federal government of a supervisory control over state 
quarantines will not take from the states or from the municipalities their inherent 
rights to protect themselves.  In the case of a municipality, for instance, the fact 
that the federal government permits a train from an infected district to pass 
through—proper precautions, of course, being taken—does not take away from 
the municipality its right to protect itself by prohibiting the landing in its midst of 
people from infected districts.  And the same right would still remain with the 
states, even with the federal government exercising the general supervision which 
seems to be contemplated in the Chattanooga resolution. 
  Federal and State Cooperation, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 12, 1905, at D4. 
154 William Hamilton Cowles, State Quarantine Laws and the Federal Constitution, 25 AM. L. REV. 
45 (1891) (quoting an unnamed member of the House of Representatives). 
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The key was to separate two questions: coastal quarantine, historically 
under state control, and geographic quarantines imposed by inland towns.  
The question of national control over seaport inspection dominated 
congressional debate, but local quarantines in the interior were also of 
significant concern.  To be sure, much of the dissatisfaction with current law 
was the lack of uniform methods to prevent the introduction of yellow fever 
through importation of cargo and persons, and the worry that port cities 
had incentives to promote their own commercial interests above all other 
considerations.  When a “uniform quarantine system” was urged, often the 
advocate meant federal control over all state seaport inspections, to interdict 
and disinfect incoming ships by application of uniform standards and 
federal resources. 
But an important component of the debate was how to stop the shotgun 
quarantine—federal ability to lift inland quarantines imposed by cities and 
towns.  As I point out below, it is one thing to have the authority to impose 
quarantine measures where states fail to act; it is quite another to prevent a 
state or local government from imposing a quarantine that it believes 
necessary for itself.  Could the federal government deprive a state or local 
government of this right? 
A. The U.S. Supreme Court, Quarantine, and Interstate Commerce 
The U.S. Supreme Court never explicitly addressed the shotgun 
quarantine, nor has the Court ever set limits on the extent to which the 
federal government might preempt any local quarantine.  But in the midst 
of yellow fever epidemics, it twice sent clear signals that Congress might 
assert such power if it chose.  This constitutional backdrop was significant 
for debates over the reach of federal authority. 
Exclusive state authority for quarantine and inspection stemmed from 
earlier pronouncements by the Supreme Court, including Gibbons v. 
Ogden.155  Health laws internal to a state could not be preempted in the 
name of interstate commerce: 
They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation, which embraces 
everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general 
government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the 
States themselves.  Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every 
description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a 
State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries[, etc.], are 
component parts of this mass.156 
 
155 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
156 Id. at 203. 
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In 1891, an article in the American Law Review explained the established 
understanding of a state’s police power to protect the health of its residents: 
It is well settled, upon the authorities, that the power to establish 
quarantine regulations rests with the States and has not been 
surrendered to the Federal government.  The source of this power lies in 
the general right of a State to provide for the health of its people, and 
although the power when exercised may, in a greater or less degree, 
affect commerce, yet quarantine laws are not enacted for that purpose, 
but solely for preserving the public health.157 
The first case in which the Supreme Court invited Congress to act in 
favor of national quarantine was Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of 
Health,158 decided in 1886.  In that case, the Court upheld quarantine rules 
imposed by Louisiana.  But the Court also advised Congress that it might 
preempt state and local quarantines: 
[I]t may be conceded that whenever Congress shall undertake to provide 
for the commercial cities of the United States a general system of 
quarantine, or shall confide the execution of the details of such a system 
to a National Board of Health, or to local boards, as may be found 
expedient, all State laws on the subject will be abrogated, at least so far as 
the two are inconsistent.  But, until this is done, the laws of the State on 
the subject are valid.159 
That pronouncement created a stir in legal circles, with a number of 
writers hypothesizing how far-reaching that federal power might be.160 Much 
of the analysis centered on Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.  
In 1877, the Court had established: 
While we unhesitatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary laws, and 
laws for the protection of life, liberty, health or property within its 
borders; while it may prevent persons and animals suffering under 
contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, [etc.], from entering the 
State; while for the purpose of self-protection it may establish quarantine, 
and reasonable inspection laws . . . . It may not, under the cover of 
exerting its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either foreign 
or inter-state commerce.161 
“[U]nder the cover of exerting its police powers” suggests a quarantine may 
not be motivated by any factor other than the protection of public health.162 
 
157 H. Campbell Black, The Police Power and the Public Health, 25 AM.  L. REV. 170, 181 (1891). 
158 Morgan’s Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455 (1886). 
159 Id. at 464. 
160 See Cowles, supra note 154, at 45, 48; John H. Girdner, Alvah H. Doty & C.M. Drake, The 
National Government and the Public Health, 165 N. AM. REV. 733 (1897); James H. McCall, 
supra note 64; Charles Merz, Growth of Federalism, 10 NEW REPUBLIC 256 (1917); D.H. 
Pingrey, Valid State Laws Incidentally Affecting Foreign and Interstate Commerce, 28 CENT. L.J. 
336 (1889); U.O.B. Wingate, National Public Health Legislation, 504 N. AM. REV. 527 (1898). 
161 R.R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1877). 
162 Id. 
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Did the dicta in Morgan’s Steamship mean that only duplicitous or 
dishonest local quarantines might be preempted by the federal government?  
At least one legal scholar thought so: “Of course if it can be said of any law 
of this sort that it is clearly not a bona fide quarantine regulation, it would 
interfere with commerce more than is necessary.”163  But who would decide 
if a shotgun quarantine was bona fide, and with what criteria?164  In 1900, a 
federal circuit court struck down a geographic quarantine of San Francisco’s 
Chinatown, primarily on the authority of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,165 but also 
because the twelve block cordon was an unreasonable restriction based 
merely on unfounded rumors of bubonic plague.166 
The second case, Louisiana v. Texas,167 arose from alleged economic 
embargoes against New Orleans.  The state of Louisiana claimed that Texas 
quarantines “place[d] an embargo on all interstate commerce between the 
city of New Orleans and the state of Texas,” and that the quarantine was a 
pretext for economic gain.168  Texas closed its borders as soon as the first 
case of yellow fever appeared in New Orleans, “the effect being to benefit 
the commerce of Galveston and of other Texas cities at the expense of the 
commerce of New Orleans.”169  Louisiana claimed such actions violated the 
federal Constitution and especially the clause regulating interstate 
commerce. 
Contemporaries understood what was at stake in the litigation.  As the 
case was pending, the Atlanta Constitution wrote: 
The suit now pending, on a petition from Louisiana, to prevent the state 
of Texas from placing an embargo upon interstate commerce from 
Louisiana, seems to us a somewhat futile remedy for the troublesome 
situation which has existed in the southwest during the summer as a 
result of the existence of yellow fever in New Orleans and in Mississippi . 
. . . Should the suit be decided in favor of Louisiana, how will the 
decision be put in force without the active employment of federal troops; 
and what will this result in but a total suspension of trade and business 
relations between the wholesale and retail merchants of Louisiana and 
the people of Texas?170 
The Supreme Court dismissed the suit on the ground that there was no 
direct issue between the states.  In order to constitute a controversy between 
states, as is required for original jurisdiction, “something more must be put 
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167 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900). 
168 Texas’ Quarantine Rights, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1900, at 10. 
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forward than that the citizens of one state are injured by the 
maladministration of the laws of another.”171 
Nonetheless, a concurring opinion suggested, once again, that Congress 
might intervene in these circumstances.  Justice John Harlan wrote: 
[I]f the allegations of the bill be true, the Texas authorities have gone 
beyond the necessities of the situation and established a quarantine 
system that is absolutely subversive of all commerce between Texas and 
Louisiana, particularly commerce between Texas and New Orleans.  This 
court has often declared that the States have the power to protect the 
health of their people by police regulations directed to that end, and that 
regulations of that character are not to be disregarded because they may 
indirectly or incidentally affect interstate commerce.  But when that 
principle has been announced it has always been said that the police 
power of a State cannot be so exerted as to obstruct foreign or interstate 
commerce beyond the necessity for its exercise, and that the courts must 
guard vigilantly against needless intrusion upon the field committed to 
Congress.172 
The Supreme Court’s invitations for Congress to act became a game of 
capture the flag in the pivotal debates of 1898 and 1906.  Presidents William 
McKinley, Teddy Roosevelt, and William Howard Taft believed the federal 
government had the authority to override a state or local quarantine and 
that it should use it.173  Congressional debates over a federal quarantine 
power that would preempt state and local quarantine orders are considered 
below. 
B. 1878–1893: First Reactions to the Shotgun Quarantine 
The first efforts to counteract the southern shotgun quarantine were 
indirect.  Coastal quarantine dominated congressional debate; inland 
quarantine received little attention.  Containing shotgun quarantines would 
be prominent aims of Congress in 1889 and 1906.  For this reason, this Part 
provides merely a brief overview of national legislation in preceding years. 
The National Board of Health (1879–1883) receives cursory treatment 
here because it had only advisory power and did not address the problems of 
the local shotgun quarantine.174  Congressional attention following the 
devastating yellow fever epidemic of 1878 did not yet focus on the shotgun 
quarantine problem, perhaps because it was not evident that this type of 
 
171 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. at 22. 
172 Id. at 23–24 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
173 See Maxey, supra note 7, at 394–95. 
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note 15, at 206–07, 235, 245–46; ELLIS, supra note 15, at 60–82; HUMPHREYS, supra note 
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quarantine would become an enduring practice.  As a contemporary 
summarized, “This law expired at the end of four years, a reenactment was 
prevented, and Congress placed an epidemic fund in the hands of the 
President to be used at his discretion in preventing and suppressing 
epidemics and maintaining quarantines at exposed points.”175  Instead, 
members of Congress directed their efforts toward improving coastal 
quarantine to prevent introduction of yellow fever from abroad. 
Proponents of a national quarantine measure, known as the “yellow fever 
bill,” justified the federal government’s intervention under its constitutional 
right to regulate commerce and to protect the country from foreign 
“invasions.”176  Opponents of the bill argued that it was unconstitutional and 
a violation of state rights.177  Southerners, it seemed, preferred federal power 
over local quarantine.  Members of the National Board of Health, meeting 
in Atlanta in 1879, reported: 
[There is] very great indignation and dissatisfaction in the Southern 
States at the fact that the Senate has refused to approve the National 
Quarantine Bill. In case nothing is done by Congress they say that it will 
be impossible to restrain the people, and that at the first intimations of 
the approach of yellow fever from the South a rigid, destructive shotgun 
quarantine system will be established by the people, who will take all law 
into their own hands.178 
Ultimately, a much weaker bill created the National Board of Health, 
one that satisfied opponents of federal power.  The Board’s functions were 
limited to advising state and local boards of health, publishing health 
information, and investigating public health questions.179  Even with the 
weakened version, some health officials in Louisiana, Georgia, and Alabama 
objected to the National Board’s potential “interference” in local affairs.180  
A memorial to Congress from Alabama stated that it was “neither wise nor 
prudent for us to entrust the administration of quarantine to the hands of 
any other health authorities than those who are of our own appointment 
and directly responsible to our own people.”181  Further, “the State can not 
afford to allow this large grant of power, so nearly affecting the welfare of 
our people, to be placed in the hands of the National Board of Health, or of 
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any other agent of the federal government.”182  Congress permitted the 
Board to expire in 1883 at the conclusion of its initial appropriations.183 
The National Health Board did, at least, set a precedent for future public 
health efforts by the federal government.  Congress had given the Board 
authority to provide money to state and local health boards “and to assume 
quarantine powers when states did not appear competent or willing to do 
so.”184  One historian concluded that “[t]here was considerable confusion 
among state and local boards over the limitations of the National Board’s 
powers,” providing as an example that the “National Board could not 
intervene until local boards had submitted itemized requests for funds.”185 
By 1893, the Marine Hospital Service (later renamed the U.S. Public 
Health Service) was given explicit statutory authorization to use interstate 
quarantine powers to prevent the introduction and spread of cholera, yellow 
fever, smallpox, and plague, with jurisdiction soon extended to include 
quarantine for all infectious and contagious diseases.186  These powers were 
to be exercised “in cooperation” with state and local health agencies.187 
1890 saw the first federal legislation specific to interstate, as opposed to 
coastal, quarantine.188  Popularly known as the “Interstate Quarantine Law” 
and titled “An act to prevent the introduction of contagious diseases from 
one State to another,” the statute provided: 
That whenever it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the 
President that cholera, yellow-fever, small-pox, or plague exists in any 
State or Territory, or in the District of Columbia, and that there is danger 
of the spread of such disease into other States . . . he is hereby authorized 
to cause the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate such rules and 
regulations as in his judgment may be necessary to prevent the spread of 
such disease from one State or Territory into another . . . and to employ 
such inspectors and other persons as may be necessary to execute such 
regulations to prevent the spread of such disease.189 
The statute directed the Supervising Surgeon General of the Marine 
Hospital to prepare regulations “under the direction of the Secretary of the 
Treasury.”190  It further provided a penalty for “any person who shall willfully 
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violate any rule or regulation so made and promulgated,” designating such 
acts as a misdemeanor punished by a fine of up to $500 or imprisonment for 
up to two years.191  But the federal government had no explicit authority 
under the statute to override local regulations.  “To prevent the spread” of 
disease could not open channels of travel and commerce against the wishes 
of local health officials.192  In any event, there is no record that this statute 
was ever enforced. 
There was surprisingly little debate on this bill.  Competing bills, both of 
which failed, sought to create a national bureau and board of health, and to 
assume federal control of port inspection and quarantine.  These garnered 
the lion’s share of attention, while the interstate bill passed with little 
comment.  One reason may have been the relative absence of yellow fever 
the previous year.193 
In remarks before the American Medical Association, John B. Hamilton, 
Supervising Surgeon General of the Marine-Hospital Service, explained that 
Treasury regulations to implement the interstate quarantine power would be 
formulated when yellow fever was known to exist in any state, “then 
regulations for the prevention of its extension shall be framed by the 
Supervising Surgeon-General.  When these regulations are approved by the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the President, they are binding upon the 
general public, and specifically upon officers of the Government, common 
carriers’ agents, officers, and employ[ee]s.”194 
As we shall see, the Treasury Department did not promulgate effective 
regulations.  One reason may have been doubts about the constitutional 
limits of this authority.  Another reason proved to be the impracticability of 
any such federal intervention within a state—the absence of any funding or 
entity empowered to carry out any such intervention.  Congress would 
consider legislation directing the Secretary of the Treasury to take steps to 
counteract shotgun quarantines in 1898 and 1906. 
C. The 1897 Epidemic: Toward a National Quarantine Law 
The return of yellow fever in serious form in 1897 brought with it the 
recurrence of local shotgun quarantines throughout the South.  This, in 




193 U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, MARINE-HOSP. BUREAU, Doc. No. 1373, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
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quarantine.  Reflecting the common view that yellow fever could not be 
interdicted through port quarantine, in 1898 the Washington Post 
emphasized that the shotgun quarantine would be an enduring problem, 
absent national legislation: 
The fact is that the South is suffering less from yellow fever than from the 
curse of the barbarous shotgun quarantine—a system which is 
notoriously inefficient as regards the protection of human life, and which 
is potent only to the destruction of commerce and the paralysis of 
civilization. . . . It is more than probable that, so long as the States retain 
control of quarantine, the hideous performances of 1897 and 1898 will 
be repeated with each fresh visitation of the disease.195 
In an article entitled “Business and Quarantine,” the Washington Post in 
1898 considered a “national quarantine system” essential for the commercial 
interests of the South: 
The moral of the situation is that a national quarantine law is wanted, so 
that a repetition of such conditions may be avoided.  It is safe to assume 
that with an effective national quarantine law in operation there would 
be an end to the senseless shotgun quarantines and non-intercourse 
regulations.196 
The Atlanta Constitution reported a “strong movement” toward a national 
quarantine law: “The movement to secure legislation at the hands of the 
United States [C]ongress to abolish the present system of state and local 
quarantine and put into effect a national quarantine is taking definite 
shape.”197  It noted that the absence of uniform quarantine practices caused 
“great harm” by “putting it within the power of every little fever scared 
community to stop the wheels of commerce and bring suffering and misery 
to the homes of thousands . . . .”198 
Again, from the Washington Post: 
Seriously, this shotgun quarantine system has reached such a stage in 
some Southern States that it will surely ruin them unless it is reformed.  
In some places it is no longer a justifiable precaution against possible 
infection, but a matter of retaliation between county and parish, city and 
town.  It is a case of “you quarantine us, we’ll quarantine you,” and some 
bumptious Board of Health or self-constituted authority on contagious 
diseases may be relied upon to carry out the threat to the letter.199 
 
195 A Southern View of the Case, WASH. POST, Oct.  24, 1898, at 6. 
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1.  Public and Private Advocacy   
Urban business interests in the South wanted authority in the national 
government to stop local shotgun quarantines.  The Birmingham 
Commercial Club, for instance, called for a “concerted movement in the 
South” to advocate federal control of quarantine, denouncing “in 
unmeasured terms the shotgun method of quarantine.”200  The Club 
initiated correspondence with the chambers of commerce, municipalities, 
and state officials in all Southern states “with a view to inducing them to 
bring pressure upon their United States Senators and Congressmen to 
secure aid in enacting a law, empowering the Federal government . . . to 
take charge of the quarantine regulations of the country . . . .”201 
That call was answered by local business organizations as well as political 
leaders of the larger cities throughout the South.202  Both the Atlanta 
Chamber of Commerce and the city’s mayor advocated for national 
quarantine, the latter noting that shotgun quarantines “are a disgrace to the 
country and the states affected have been held up to scorn and ridicule.”203  
The mayor and leading businessmen of Atlanta traveled to Washington, D.C. 
to urge Congress to enact a national quarantine law, reportedly receiving 
“assurance of hearty co-operation from President McKinley,” who promised 
to “send a special message urging its passage.”204 
Lobbyists representing business interests beset state legislatures as well as 
Congress.  In December 1897, the Georgia legislature overwhelmingly 
passed a resolution asking its congressional delegation to push for a uniform 
system of quarantine under federal control.205  Governor William Atkinson 
maintained that the resolution “proposed to surrender to the national 
government an important power which is now vested in the state.”206  
Governor Atkinson explained: 
The bill under consideration proposes to turn over to the national 
government, whenever it sees fit to enact the necessary legislation, all 
quarantine matters in this state, in case of an outbreak of yellow fever, 
smallpox, cholera or plague.  When this is done the liberty of the citizen 
and the right of travel of our people are taken out of the hands of the 
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state government—in fact, the life and liberty of our people is placed in 
the hands of officers appointed by the federal government.207 
The Governor nonetheless forwarded copies of the resolution to the 
members of the Georgia Congressional delegation, along with his veto.208 
2.  Deficiency of Existing Law: Hearings Before Congress   
In February 1898, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce held hearings on the question of interstate quarantine—the first 
time the shotgun quarantine featured in a Congressional debate.209  Of five 
separate bills in all, two of them—the “Caffery Bill” and the “Spooner Bill”—
received the most attention.210 
The Caffery Bill, introduced in the Senate by Donelson Caffery of 
Louisiana, placed quarantine regulations “exclusively in the hands of the 
national authorities,” and further provided that when yellow fever eluded 
port quarantine and appeared within any state or territory, “the quarantine 
regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury shall be supreme and have 
precedence over state or municipal quarantine laws,” authorizing the 
President to enforce them.211 
William P. Hepburn of Iowa, an eleven-term Republican congressman, 
sponsored the Senate Caffery Bill in the House.212  Importantly, he also 
chaired the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce for 
twelve years, from 1895 to 1909,213 and in that period was a champion of 
increased federal interstate quarantine power.  At the hearings, Hepburn 
zeroed in on the problem of inland interstate quarantine.  Guiding the 
witnesses away from coastal seaport issues, Hepburn repeatedly questioned 
witnesses about, as he termed it, “what some people have irreverently spoken 
of as a ‘shotgun quarantine’.”214 
In Hepburn’s view, the current statutory scheme permitted the federal 
government to impose quarantines to prevent the spread of disease from 
one state into another, but not to lift quarantines imposed by state or local 
authorities.  The existing statutes were commonly interpreted to mean that 
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federal authorities were unable to act until requested to do so by a state or 
municipal health board.  But Hepburn believed greater federal authority 
was necessary to prevent the local shotgun quarantine, which the Caffery Bill 
would provide. 
The Spooner Bill, by contrast, placed no absolute control over local 
quarantines in federal hands, preferring instead a collaborative advisory 
board consisting of state and local health officials.  Supporters of this 
measure criticized the Caffery Bill on the ground that it lacked such 
representatives.  As one witness characterized the Caffery Bill, “[I]t seeks to 
make the Supervising Surgeon General the health dictator of the United 
States, against whose mandates there is provided no right of appeal, and who 
is controlled in his acts by no provision of law and is as unfettered in the 
exercise of his power as is his ambition to rule.”215  The Spooner proposal, by 
contrast, would provide for local input and would operate as a national 
health association “where the majority rules.”216 
Another Committee member, Representative Hawley, posed the issue 
this way: 
[W]ithout regard to the facts as to whether fever exists or does not exist, 
at the slightest rumor there will be established near towns and villages 
what is properly known as the shotgun quarantine.  The quarantine is 
sometimes justified under conditions existing there, but frequently it is 
not justified by any facts that exist or any disease which exists.  That is a 
case within the limits of a State, but in order to pass from one village to 
another in the State it is important that interstate commerce should pass 
in order to maintain commerce between those two villages.”217 
The Committee heard testimony from prominent physicians and public 
health officials.  Dr. Alvah H. Doty, director of quarantine for the port of 
New York and a supporter of the Spooner bill,218 sought to distance state 
health boards from the recent “shotgun quarantines in the south,” causing 
“the trouble that interfered with the transportation of goods, commerce, or 
anything of that character.”219 
Dr. Doty attributed the local shotgun quarantine to a difference in 
opinion among local health officers: 
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It is the fact that in Texas and other places where they had shotgun 
quarantines that health officers differed in their opinion.  They might be 
all good, but the result was a popular clamor and things of that character.  
They formulated rules which were unjust.  We all believe there should be 
some Government supervision and regulations to harmonize these 
things, but we do not believe the Federal Government should interfere 
with the details of these local health matters.220 
Chairman Hepburn pressed witnesses on the interstate commerce issue, 
but he could not get a direct answer.  Dr. H. B. Horlbeck, a health officer 
from Charleston, South Carolina, defended the right of his city to impose a 
quarantine against passengers and traffic.221  Hepburn asked whether “[t]he 
same right you would assume to yourself in Charleston every other city on 
the road from New Orleans to the city of Washington on the Coast Line 
would exercise, would they not?”222 
THE CHAIRMAN: In that way you would destroy all travel and all commerce 
between the city of Washington and the city of Charleston? . . . If you can 
exercise this authority and because of your force hold a man or hold his 
property there four or five days until you subjected to quarantine? 
DR. HORLBECK: We want a little quarantine; we only want to be satisfied it 
is all right. 
THE CHAIRMAN: Suppose you would have this; then if every other city 
would have the same and every other village had a quarantine, would you 
not entirely destroy by the exercise of that kind of power all 
communication between the different cities in the United States because 
of the fear you may have? 
DR. HORLBECK: I do not think practically we would exercise it. . . . 
THE CHAIRMAN: You are insisting, however, upon the power to do it? 
DR. HORLBECK: I think we ought to have that because there may be some 
person, even if the Marine-Hospital Service employed the best talent to 
assist them, they may be wrong; all human agency is liable to that. . . . I 
do not think they ought to have the final power to permit those things to 
come into our borders without our being permitted to say anything 
about it.223 
In addition to highlighting the distrust of the federal government’s 
expertise, Horlbeck also pointed out the impracticality of federal 
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intervention at the local level.  “I do not think it might be wise at any time to 
have the Government undertake [quarantine] locally, and I do not 
think . . . that in the local boards of health in 10,000 towns and villages and 
townships you should have Federal officers; you would break the nation 
almost.”224 
Representative T. M. Mahon of Pennsylvania appeared as one of the few 
witnesses in favor of the Caffery Bill.  Often, he interrogated members of the 
Committee, rather than the other way around: 
During the last trouble with yellow fever, a man traveling there, perfectly 
well, was pulled off at the State line, at the mouth of the shotgun, and 
not allowed to go into another State, and not allowed to go back.  Will 
you tell me the action of the United States, under the powers of the 
Constitution regulating interstate commerce, does not have power to 
interfere in behalf of that citizen and say that no such treatment shall be 
accorded him?225 
When questioned by Representative James Mann (R-Ill.), however, Mahon 
posited that the federal government’s authority could only function at state 
borders: 
MR. MANN: All of the transportation lines which run from Cincinnati or 
Chicago, or those cities and that territory, run through Tennessee going 
south to New Orleans.  Suppose the State board of health simply says that 
they have yellow fever in the South, and they will not permit 
transportation to go through Tennessee? 
MR. MAHON: Under the interstate commerce law, what is the right due 
your State, then?  It is as clear as the sun under the heavens that one 
State has no right to interfere— 
MR. MANN: But suppose they do? 
MR. MAHON: Then [the Caffery Bill] provides that this bureau shall 
establish on the State line, to protect your people, quarantine stations, 
and that all passengers shall be examined there, all freight and 
passengers shall be stopped, and freight disinfected, and then sent on its 
way. 
. . . . 
MR. MANN: To that extent, then, it would override the State authority? 
 
224 Id. at 31. The point was emphasized in an exchange with Rep. Robert Davey (D-La.): 
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MR. MAHON: Yes, sir; and should override it.  You see, in that panic down 
there people lost their heads.226 
Finally, Mahon insisted that passengers, as well as freight, were protected 
by the federal Constitution’s Commerce Clause: 
MR. MAHON: Am I not a subject of commerce? 
THE CHAIRMAN: No. 
MR. MAHON (continuing): Going from State to State, I am as fully 
protected under that interstate-commerce clause of the Constitution as a 
barrel of flour.”227 
Representative Mahon centered Congress’s power over interstate travel 
in the Commerce Clause.  That transportation of persons was “commerce” 
first appears in Gibbons v. Ogden.228  Mahon’s idea is similar to the nascent 
“right to travel,” dating back to the Passenger Cases of 1849, in which Justice 
Taney wrote that “[w]e are all citizens of the United States; and, as members 
of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through 
every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.”229  An 
important difference, however, is that the shotgun quarantine excluded all 
travelers, including residents of a state attempting to return home.230 
As Hepburn and the Committee viewed it, only the Caffery Bill provided 
room for the federal government to intervene directly in a local quarantine.  
It would “prevent unnecessary restrictions upon interstate commerce” by, 
among other means, authorizing the Marine Service Hospital to issue 
federal travel permits for both passengers and freight.231  Any person 
interfering with the permit from the federal authorities would be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanor.  As one critic of the bill characterized, 
“[t]herefore, any health officer who shall disregard a permit which he 
 
226 Id. at 44. 
227 Id. at 46.  The uncertain reach of the Interstate Commerce Clause in this period received 
substantial attention from legal scholars.  See, e.g., H. Campbell Black, The Police Power and 
the Public Health, 25 AM. L. REV. 170, 175 (1891) (highlighting the limitations of police 
power in inspecting the purity of food products due to the constraints of interstate 
commerce); Charles A. Culberson, The Supreme Court and Interstate Commerce, 24 AM. L. 
REV. 25, 25 (1890) (observing that the “difficult and perplexing subject” of interstate 
commerce is hotly disputed in courts across the nation); D.H. Pingrey, Valid State Laws 
Incidentally Affecting Foreign and Interstate Commerce, 28 CENT. L.J. 336, 336 (1889) (noting 
that the questions surrounding the interstate commerce clause are complex and 
difficult). 
228 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189–90 (1824) (explaining that the word 
“commerce” should not be interpreted so narrowly that it excludes the idea of 
navigation). 
229 Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, J., dissenting). 
230 Id. 
231 1898 Quarantine Powers Hearing, supra note 139, at 22–24 (1898) (statement of Dr. H. 
Horlbeck, Health Officer of Charleston, S.C.).  There was apparently no provision for 
individuals who obtained a permit fraudulently or who subsequently developed yellow 
fever. 
Dec. 2016] EPIDEMICS, OUTSIDERS, AND LOCAL PROTECTION 413 
 
regards dangerous to his community shall wear stripes in a common prison 
or penitentiary and pay a fine which may beggar him.”232 
Hepburn was unmoved: “Why is it not a better plan to say that the 
General Government will carry on a quarantine system, and that nobody else 
shall interfere with it?”233 
As an anti-climax to the first sustained congressional investigation of the 
shotgun quarantine, all of the bills presented that session were destined to 
fail.  The declaration of war against Spain and the contemplated invasion of 
Cuba put aside any further consideration of the shotgun quarantine.234  
Legislation addressing it would not be taken up until the next (and last) 
epidemic of yellow fever ravaged the South, and after U.S. troops in Cuba 
had been decimated by the disease.235  In the interim, advocates continued 
to press the need for interstate intervention by the federal government: 
When the comfort and commerce of millions of people are at stake it 
should not be left with the power of isolated communities to set all in 
confusion and to institute a reign of terror.  The day of the local shotgun 
quarantine has gone by, and the time has come for our people to act 
upon common sense principles.236 
As would be the case in the fifty-ninth Congress, however, such dire 
pronouncements failed to secure the needed legislation. 
D. The 1905 Epidemic: A Narrow Defeat for Federal Intervention 
The epidemic of 1905 proved once again that state governments in the 
South could not control local shotgun quarantines.  Louisiana threatened to 
use troops to lift local quarantines after the State Board of Health ordered 
restrictions on travel and traffic removed, denouncing those quarantines as 
“illegal . . . and inhuman.”237  In the opinion of the Washington Post, “[t]he 
 
232 Id. at 22. 
233 Id. at 45 (statement of W.P. Hepburn, Chairman, Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce). 
234 See id. at 108.  The last action in the Senate was a committee’s proposed amendment, as 
follows:  “Nothing in this act shall be construed to interfere with the right of any State to 
protect its citizens from infectious or contagious diseases by such rules and regulations as 
the authorities of said State may deem necessary and which do not conflict with the rules 
and regulations made by the Secretary of the Treasury, as hereinbefore provided, to 
prevent the introduction of infectious or contagious diseases into the United States from 
foreign countries or the spread of such diseases.”  National Quarantine Bill—Mr. Vest Makes 
an Earnest Speech in Behalf of National Control of Health Laws, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 16, 
1898, at 7. 
235  The specific legislation referenced here is discussed below.  For background on the ef-
fects of the yellow fever during the Spanish-American war, see Alfred Jay Bollet, Military 
Medicine in the Spanish-American War, 48 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 293. 
236 Extending the National Quarantine, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 22, 1899, at 4. 
237 Fight on Quarantine: Louisiana May Use Troops to Lift Local Embargoes, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 
1905, at 1. 
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indications are that unless an early break occurs in the shotgun quarantine 
in Louisiana, something very like war will break out in this State.”238 
The important question of control of interstate commerce, left hanging 
in 1898, now could not be avoided.  The denouement of the interstate 
quarantine question arrived in 1906, when a conference committee of 
Congress rejected a provision that would have imposed federal control over 
rail travel within states. 
The 1906 congressional session occurred against the backdrop of the 
Chattanooga regional conference, with its call for national quarantine 
authority, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Louisiana v. Texas in 
1900.  With the exception of Texas and a divided congressional delegation 
from Georgia, the South was united in support of federal intervention.239  
The Chicago Record-Herald concluded it proved “the old State’s rights 
doctrine is a creed outworn.”240 
For national control of border and seaport entry, the crowning 
achievement of the 1906 Congress was “The National Quarantine Law of 
1906.”241  Over the strenuous objection of New York public health officers, 
the Act at last provided for full national control over port and international 
border quarantine stations, with authorization to purchase any facilities still 
operated by states.  But the measure was nearly derailed by a last-minute 
attempt to provide for federal quarantine authority within states.  As the 
Atlanta Constitution reported: 
For some weeks the passage of the bill was jeopardized by an effort to 
incorporate a clause which would have given the government control of 
interstate quarantines, the idea being to eliminate the possibility of the 
old drastic regulations enforced by the shotgun.  In the end this 
provision was stricken, the majority being of the opinion that if the 
marine hospital service were given full control of port stations the 
entrance of disease would be rendered next to impossible, and that there 
would be no development of complications giving rise to interstate and 
local squabbles.242 
The dispute centered on the insertion of an additional provision, known 
as the new “Section 7,” by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
 
238 Id.  The shotgun quarantine also extended outside of the deep South.  See also Officers 
Clash over Fever Law, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 24, 1905, at 2 (reporting that Illinois state 
health officials ordered federal quarantine officers not to enter Cairo, Illinois). 
239 See e.g., 40 CONG. REC. 5387, 5389 (1906) (statement of Rep. Jack Beall); National 
Quarantine Favored by the House, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 4, 1906, at 5. 
240 Not a Decadent Doctrine, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1906, at 6 (quoting the Chicago Record-Herald 
(1906)).  On the other hand, resistance to federal authority over quarantine extended to 
the Illinois Board of Health.  See Officers Clash Over Fever Law, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 24, 
1905, at 2. 
241 Act of June 19, 1906, ch. 3433, 34 Stat. 299 (1906) (“An Act to further protect the public 
health and make more effective the national quarantine.”). 
242 Federal Quarantine Control, ATLANTA CONST., June 26, 1906, at 6. 
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Commerce.  This section empowered federal authorities to prevent the 
interruption of rail traffic within a state.243  If federal authorities certified 
that a train’s passengers and cargo were free from infection, no state or local 
government could prevent passage through the state without risking 
criminal prosecution.  The measure provided only for “pass through” 
jurisdiction; it would not override a wholly local shotgun quarantine.244  But 
even this limited “pass through” clause was too much for opponents. 
William P. Hepburn, still chairman of the House Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce Committee (his tenure would span from 1892 to 1908), had 
made it clear that he would not report any bill that did not provide for an 
effective federal interstate quarantine.245  As the Washington Post reported, 
“the majority of the committee insisted that if the Federal government 
appropriates a large sum of money for quarantine there must also be given 
enough power to prevent shotgun quarantines similar to that Mississippi 
enforced recently . . . .”246 
In the House of Representatives, only twenty-six votes were cast against 
the Committee bill, but spirited debate by dissenters featured “sharp 
exchanges” and lengthy discourses on constitutional law.247  The additional 
feature of the bill, some argued, would jeopardize the original purpose to 
mandate federal control of seaport and land border quarantine.248  While 
apparently an accurate observation on the political alignments at issue, that 
alignment had nothing to do with the merits of whether federal action in 
inland areas was a good idea. 
 
243 40 CONG. REC.  5387, 5389 (1906) (statement of Rep. Jack Beall).  The amended text 
provided: 
SEC 7. That every common carrier, engaged in interstate commerce, shall, under 
such regulations, restrictions, and safeguards as may be promulgated by the 
Secretary of the Treasury, receive, carry, and transport through any State or 
Territory necessary to complete the journey or carriage into a State wherein 
delivery or debarkation may be lawful, all passengers, freight, or baggage which 
may have been discharged and properly certified in accordance with the 
regulations of the Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service; and every person 
interfering with or obstructing such carrier or any passenger or any 
instrumentality of commerce in any such carriage or journey shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and on conviction thereof be punished by a fine not exceeding $300 
or be imprisoned for a period not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion 
of the court: Provided, That this section shall not be construed as giving authority 
to any person to debark or unloaded freight in any locality contrary to the lawful 
regulations thereof. 
244 S. 4250, April 10, 1906. 
245 National Quarantine Bill Discussed by Committee, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1906, at 4. 
246 Id. 
247 National Quarantine Favored by the House, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 4, 1906, at 5. 
248 Id. 
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As Representative Jack Beall of Texas stated, “[w]e protest against this 
section as a vicious, unwaranted [sic], and unnecessary interference with the 
right of a State to protect its people:”249 
Section 7 is in contradiction to all the other sections.  It is not a 
quarantine section; it is a commercial section.  It places no embargo 
upon the movement of persons and property from the infected to 
noninfected points, but facilitates such movement.  It does not lessen the 
opportunities for the transmission of disease; it increases them.  It will 
not check yellow fever; it will spread it.  It does not look to the protection 
of life and health of the people; it protects the railroads.  It is not 
responsive to the demands of the people; it is in obedience to the behests 
of the transportation companies.  It subordinates the rights of the States 
and the lives of human beings to the right of railroad companies to pile 
up earnings to satisfy the greed of stockholders.250 
Supporters, by contrast, pointed to a recent incident highlighting the 
need for national intervention.  The governor of Arkansas prevented a train 
carrying refugees from Louisiana to pass through the state.251  In response, 
Representative Beall decried the combined efforts of Louisiana, Mississippi, 
and Alabama to upset the constitutional scheme: 
Our regret over this lamentable result is increased by the reflection that 
in other days the people of the South have stood steadfastly as the 
defenders of the faith of the fathers, while to-day [sic] this crusade for 
the dishonor of the States is led by those coming from what has 
heretofore been the very citadel of State sovereignty.252 
The House voted to approve the bill by a comfortable margin (172–22), 
but the Senate bill, previously passed unanimously, had not included any 
interstate quarantine measure, and indeed the Senate appears not to have 
considered it, as Section 7 was a late addition to the House measure.253  The 
Senate had approved the original bill on April 2.  Because the House 
measure included Section 7 while the Senate bill did not, the two bills were 
sent to a reconciliation committee. 
The showdown over interstate quarantine thus moved to the House-
Senate conference committee.  That committee agreed to strike Section 7.254  
Although the conference report did not explain the committee’s reasoning, 
apparently the committee’s members were deadlocked for some time.255  
 




253 Id. at 5392. 
254 H.R. REP. NO. 59-4920, at 1 (1906) (Conf. Rep.). 
255 Quarantine Bill in Peril, ATLANTA CONST., June 7, 1906, at 7 (“There is decided danger that 
the quarantine bill intended to give federal aid in yellow fever quarantines and which has 
passed the [S]enate and [H]ouse, will fail, because of a deadlock among the conferees on 
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Against this opposition to Section 7, the conference committee preferred to 
preserve the Act’s primary purpose to assume national control over port 
quarantine.256 
Debates in the House on both April 3 and April 17 featured lengthy 
analysis of the conflict between the federal government’s authority over 
interstate commerce and traditional state police power over local public 
health.257  In Congress, W.C. Adamson,  Representative from Columbus, 
Georgia, and a member of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
Committee, defended the local quarantine: 
There is no reason for conflict of authority.  It is the right and duty of the 
federal government to exclude infection from the entire country and to 
regulate its transmission among the states, territories and Indian tribes, 
provided, as the [S]upreme [C]ourt says, it is really a precaution to 
protect health and not a sham or pretense to promote commerce at the 
expense of health. 
If the federal government neglects its duty and a state fears danger, the 
state may prevent the entrance of anything or anybody into its borders, 
except for rapid transit through the state, and the more rapid the better.  
No power in earth can override the state in the exercise of such 
authority.  If the state sees no danger, a town or a county may exercise 
the same authority under the same regulations, the difference in the 
three being in the extent of territory covered and not inefficiency, and 
impotency of authority.258 
The Marine Hospital Service, meanwhile, operated under Treasury 
Department regulations that were issued piecemeal as yellow fever spread.259  
Compiled from telegrams and circulars, the regulations were limited to 
localities where federal health officers had been invited to help, and 
consisted of directions for the establishment of refugee camps, 
dissemination of reports of yellow fever cases, and inspection of trains at 
state lines.260 
 
the seventh section of the bill. . . . A movement has been inaugurated lately, however, to 
get the section mentioned withdrawn rather than defeat the bill.”). 
256 Federal Quarantine Control, ATLANTA CONST., June 26, 1906, at 6 (“For some weeks the 
passage of the bill was jeopardized by an effort to incorporate a clause which would have 
given the government control of interstate quarantines, the idea being to eliminate the 
possibility of the old drastic regulations enforced by the shotgun.  In the end this 
provision was stricken, the majority being of the opinion that if the marine hospital 
service were given full control of port stations the entrance of disease would be rendered 
next to impossible, and that there would be no development of complications giving rise 
to interstate and local squabbles.”). 
257 40 CONG. REC. 4661–4685 (1906); 40 CONG. REC. 5388 (1906). 
258 Adamson Talks on Quarantines, ATLANTA CONST., Nov. 11, 1905, at 3. 
259  See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 48, 193 (referencing various Treasury Department regu-
lations). 
260 See J. H. White, Synopsis of the Interstate Quarantine Regulations of the Treasury Department, in 
U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, MARINE-HOSP. SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERVISING 
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Constitutional doubts about the federal government’s interstate 
quarantine authority seem to have receded, but members of Congress 
recognized that effective implementation was not possible.  As a practical 
matter, congressional leaders concluded there was very little the federal 
government could do to suppress the shotgun quarantine. 
Symbolically, some viewed the bill to have redeemed the South with 
respect to its reintegration into the union, despite the failure of the 
interstate quarantine provision.  The Louisville Times reported: 
It is in a double sense a victory for the south, first in the establishment of 
the fact that the south has come to recognize that it is a part of the 
national government, and as such, is entitled to her share in the benefits 
of the national government . . . . If the law goes into effect it will save the 
south thousands in commerce, and scores of lives.  It will put an end to 
the disgrace brought by demagogues who seek the critical occasion of 
epidemic peril to exploit themselves at the threatened peril of their own 
and their sister states.261 
This sustained national debate centered on where state police power 
ended in matters of public health.  The legislative failure in Congress did 
not necessarily reflect an understanding of constitutional limitation, but 
instead was a political compromise.  The failure also reflected the federal 
government’s limited agency resources—the proponents of greater federal 
authority simply could not imagine how the goals of federal intervention 
might be accomplished. 
Because the United States would experience no further epidemics of 
yellow fever after 1905, the issue of interstate quarantine had no urgency 
and never again received the sustained attention of Congress.  Discovery of 
the mosquito vector would eventually lessen the need for federal 
intervention in local quarantine matters.  As the Washington Post noted in 
1916, “[w]hen yellow fever was traced directly to the responsible mosquito 
the shotgun was laid aside, and with it departed a chill of fear fully as 
prevalent and almost as much to be feared as the disease itself.”262 
 
SURGEON-GENERAL OF THE MARINE-HOSPITAL SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR 1898, at 412–14 (1899) and P. H. Bailhache, A Précis of the United States 
Quarantine Regulations for Domestic Ports with Reference to Preventing the Introduction of Yellow 
Fever into the United States, in U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, MARINE-HOSP. SERVICE, ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE SUPERVISING SURGEON-GENERAL OF THE MARINE-HOSPITAL SERVICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1898, at 414–24 (1899) for a summary of regulations 
during the 1897 epidemic.  See also U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, BUREAU OF PUB. HEALTH AND 
MARINE-HOSP. SERV., supra note 48, for a summary of regulations issued during the 1905 
epidemic. 
261 The National Quarantine Law, ATLANTA CONST., Apr. 7, 1906, at 8 (quoting The Louisville 
Times’s discussion “of the passage of the bill by the lower house”). 
262 Value of Quarantine, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1916, at 4. 
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IV. MODERN ECHOES: FROM QUARANTINE TO SYRIAN REFUGEES 
Where matters stood in 1906 is essentially where they stand today.  If a 
state fails to act in the face of a threatened epidemic or requests assistance, 
the federal government can intervene.  But if a state or local government 
acts in a way that is unnecessary or excessive, we are just as bewildered about 
federal authority as in the days of the shotgun quarantine. 
There is little reason to think the modern Supreme Court would view the 
matter differently than it did in both 1886 and 1900.  The federal 
government’s power to override state-imposed quarantine regulations is not 
restricted by the federal constitution.  The seminal difference, of course, is 
the intervention of the due process revolution of the mid-twentieth century.  
Courts can and will review individual quarantine orders on due process 
grounds, requiring state and local governments to respect the civil liberties 
of persons it segregates from the community.263  Such review, however, 
occurs only after a quarantine or isolation order is in place or has ended.264  
Local health officials are not required to seek court approval in advance.265 
Viewed in this light, Ebola (and perhaps, now, the Zika virus) might be 
seen to pose the same problem as the yellow fever shotgun quarantine:  
Uninformed or self-interested populations allow political or commercial 
interests to overcome expert medical opinion, in a manner highly disruptive 
to national interests.  Some states imposed arguably more expansive Ebola 
quarantine policies than were necessary to protect public health, disrupting 
interstate commerce and travel as well as violating civil liberties.266 
Public health law in the United States is still largely a matter of state 
authority.  If anything, local quarantine is infinitely more complicated today 
by new means of travel, particularly airplanes and the automobile.  It is one 
thing to concede federal quarantine authority at national borders; it is quite 
another to prevent or preempt state and local quarantines or other 
 
263 Polly Price, Quarantine and Liability in the Context of Ebola, 131 PUB. HEALTH REP. 500, 501 
(2016). 
264 Id. 
265 A recent comparison is the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, which grants 
public health powers to state and local public health authorities.  THE CTRS. FOR LAW & 
THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA), 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/ModelLaws/MSEHPA.php (“[T]o ensure a strong, 
effective . . . response mechanism[] to public health emergencies . . . while also 
respecting individual rights.”). 
266 See Matt Flegenheimer et al., Under Pressure, Cuomo Says Ebola Quarantines Can Be Spent at 
Home, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2014, at A24 (highlighting criticisms and opposition to New 
Jersey’s Ebola quarantine initiative); see also CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION, Interim Table of State Ebola Screening and Monitoring Policies for Asymptomatic 
Individuals, www.cdc.gov/phlp/publications/topic/ebola.html (enumerating state Ebola 
quarantine rules). 
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protective barriers that are unnecessary and beyond a legitimate need, even 
if those actions might be motivated solely by panic and fear. 
A. Federal Quarantine Authority Today 
It is understood today that the federal government derives its quarantine 
and isolation authority from the Commerce Clause.  The modern statute 
provides: 
The Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary, is authorized to 
make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to 
prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable 
diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from 
one State or possession into any other State or possession.267 
The statute limits federal quarantine power to U.S. entry points and to 
persons believed “to be moving or about to move from a State to another 
State . . . .”268  The CDC is tasked with federal quarantine orders; to date it 
has exercised that authority only rarely, and only for individuals rather than 
groups or populations.269  For example, the CDC maintains a “Do Not 
Board” list preventing air travel for patients with any infectious disease that 
is a potential public health threat to passengers, including infectious 
tuberculosis.270  Persons are added to the Do Not Board list only with reliable 
medical information provided by a state public health official and following 
a reviewed approval process by the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services.271 
 
267 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2012). 
268 42 U.S.C. § 264(d)(1) (2012) (“Regulations prescribed under this section may provide for 
the apprehension and examination of any individual reasonably believed to be infected 
with a communicable disease in a qualifying stage and (A) to be moving or about to move 
from a State to another State; or (B) to be a probable source of infection to individuals 
who, while infected with such disease in a qualifying stage, will be moving from a State to 
another State.”). 
269 See Criteria for Requesting Federal Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, 
Including for Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,400, 16,400–02 (Mar. 27, 2015) 
(listing procedures and criteria for restricting individuals with communicable disases 
from traveling).  This Notice describes the tools the federal government has to ensure 
that people with serious contagious diseases that pose a public health threat do not board 
commercial flights or enter into the United States without a public health evaluation. 
270 Id. 
271 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, About Quarantine and Isolation (Aug. 28, 
2014), http://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/QuarantineIsolation.html (describing specific 
travel restriction requirements for those who have a communicable disease); see also 
Federal Air Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION: MMWR WEEKLY (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/ mm5737a1.htm (reviewing a variety of statistical figures relating to CDC 
requests to place people on the Do Not Board list between 2007 and 2008). 
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There is no explicit authorization to impose a quarantine that operates 
wholly within a state, and the statutory scheme appears to prohibit the 
abrogation of a state or locally-imposed quarantine.272  Instead, Congress has 
emphasized cooperation with states: 
The Secretary is authorized to accept from State and local authorities any 
assistance in the enforcement of quarantine regulations made pursuant 
to this chapter which such authorities may be able and willing to provide.  
The Secretary shall also assist States and their political subdivisions in the 
prevention and suppression of communicable diseases and with respect 
to other public health matters, shall cooperate with and aid State and 
local authorities in the enforcement of their quarantine and other health 
regulations, and shall advise the several States on matters relating to the 
preservation and improvement of the public health.273 
The Code of Federal Regulations permits unspecified intervention in the 
event that measures by state or local health authorities “are insufficient to 
prevent the spread of any of the communicable diseases from such State or 
possession to any other State or possession,” although the context of the 
provision emphasizes control of livestock and other animals, not persons.274  
Moreover, that provision addresses measures deemed “insufficient” but not 
measures deemed excessive—the shotgun quarantine problem.275 
 
272 See 42 U.S.C. § 264(e) (2012) (“Nothing in this section or section 266 of this title, or the 
regulations promulgated under such sections, may be construed as superseding any 
provision under State law (including regulations and including provisions established by 
political subdivisions of States), except to the extent that such a provision conflicts with 
an exercise of Federal authority under this section or section 266 of this title.”). 
273 42 U.S.C. § 243(a) (2012) (appearing under the subchapter heading entitled, “General 
grant of authority for cooperation”). 
274 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2000) (“Whenever the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention determines that the measures taken by health authorities of any State or 
possession (including political subdivisions thereof) are insufficient to prevent the spread 
of any of the communicable diseases from such State or possession to any other State or 
possession, he/she may take such measures to prevent such spread of the diseases as 
he/she deems reasonably necessary, including inspection, fumigation, disinfection, 
sanitation, pest extermination, and destruction of animals or articles believed to be 
sources of infection.”). 
275 See 42 C.F.R. § 70.3 (2003) (“A person who has a communicable disease in the 
communicable period shall not travel from one State or possession to another without a 
permit from the health officer of the State, possession, or locality of destination, if such 
permit is required under the law applicable to the place of destination.  Stop-overs other 
than those necessary for transportation connections shall be considered as places of 
destination.”); see also 42 C.F.R. § 70.6 (2003) (“Regulations prescribed in this part 
authorize the detention, isolation, quarantine, or conditional release of individuals, for 
the purpose of preventing the introduction, transmission, and spread of the 
communicable diseases listed in an Executive Order setting out a list of quarantinable 
communicable diseases . . . .”) (applying to persons entering the United States).  None of 
these provisions explicitly authorize a “Do Not Board” list, and, in fact, CDC relies on 
Transportation Safety Administration (“TSA”) authority for purposes of “requesting” that 
TSA place individuals on the public health “Do Bot board” list.  See Criteria for 
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We have today the same balance of power by statute: an affirmative 
power to intervene to prevent the spread of disease does not imply a 
negative power to preempt a local quarantine.  Under the Commerce 
Clause, Congress could authorize such intervention within states, but it has 
not done so.276  The federal government has been hesitant to exercise this 
authority without statutory authorization.  One difference, however, is that 
in the nineteenth century the administration of quarantine would not have 
been considered a regulatory power of the federal government, whereas 
today this authority is rarely questioned.277  The federal government’s power 
to intervene in state public health measures is unnecessarily limited by 
Congress.  Inherent authority resides in the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
B. Ebola Controversies, and a Preview of the Zika Virus? 
In late 2014, Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey led a group of four 
states to publicly declare stricter quarantines in their states than either the 
CDC or the World Health Organization recommended.278  Two lawsuits seek 
damages for Ebola quarantines imposed in these states.  To be sure, these 
quarantines were not remotely equivalent to the exclusion cordons of the 
shotgun quarantine.  State governments did not turn away persons at 
political boundaries or otherwise prevent entry (despite calls to do so), but 
the number of persons potentially exposed to Ebola were low and easy to 
capture through airport screening of those returning from Ebola-infected 
areas in western Africa.  Nonetheless, the actions of these State governors 
engendered substantial debate about the desirability of a federal role. 
 
Requesting Federal Travel Restrictions for Public Health Purposes, Including for Viral 
Hemorrhagic Fevers, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,400, 16,4001 (Mar. 27, 2015) (explaining the legal 
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In the first lawsuit, Kaci Hickox returned to the United States from 
Sierra Leone, where she had worked for Médecins Sans Frontières at an 
Ebola treatment unit.279  In a widely publicized series of events, Hickox spent 
nearly four days in isolation by order of the New Jersey Department of 
Health, initially at Newark Liberty International Airport.280  News reports 
followed her subsequent removal to Maine where she remained confined to 
her residence under an isolation order.281  Hickox exhibited no symptoms 
throughout her isolation and never developed Ebola.282 
While she was under a quarantine order in Maine, attorneys for Hickox 
successfully sued the Maine Department of Health to modify the strict home 
confinement.  The quarantine order in Maine became the first, and so far 
only, judicial modification of a public health order related to Ebola.  A state 
judge ruled that public health officials had not proved “by clear and 
convincing evidence that limiting respondent’s movements to the degree 
requested” was needed to protect the public.283  The modification eased the 
most stringent aspect of the order—home seclusion for three weeks—while 
retaining monitoring and social distancing aspects of the quarantine order 
consistent with CDC recommendations.284  Medical groups argued that 
automatic quarantines of three weeks for persons displaying no symptoms 
discouraged health care workers from traveling to Ebola-stricken 
countries,285 while Maine and other states contended that such restrictions 
were necessary to protect public health.286 
With the support of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), in late 
2015 Hickox filed a lawsuit over her treatment in New Jersey, naming as 
defendants Governor Chris Christie and the Commissioner of the New 
Jersey Department of Health.287  The lawsuit alleges that upon arriving at 
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Newark Liberty International Airport, Hickox was taken into custody and 
detained without medical grounds or legal justification for approximately 80 
hours.288  Hickox also claims that Governor Christie made false statements to 
news media implying that she showed symptoms of the disease.289  Among 
other comments, Governor Christie told news media that Hickox was 
“obviously ill” and “I’m sorry if in any way she was inconvenienced but 
inconvenience that could occur from having folks that are symptomatic and 
ill out amongst the public is a much, much greater concern of mine.”290  
Unlike the Maine lawsuit, which sought modification of an existing public 
health order, in this lawsuit Hickox seeks $250,000 in compensatory and 
punitive damages.291 
In a second lawsuit, students working with Yale’s legal services 
organization and the ACLU filed a class action against the governor of 
Connecticut and state public health officials over the state’s treatment of 
residents affected by Connecticut’s Ebola quarantine policies.292  The 
complaint seeks damages on behalf of Connecticut residents who were 
quarantined for up to three weeks in fall 2014, with police officers posted 
outside their residences.293  The complaint also argues that the court should 
enjoin future such quarantines that might be imposed in an outbreak of the 
Zika virus or other potential epidemics.294  In response to medical experts 
who had questioned the quarantine policy as unnecessary and politically 
driven, the state’s infectious disease director wrote: “The quarantine 
definition is very 19th century, making 21st-century quarantine options 
difficult to implement.”295 
Both lawsuits claim violation of individual civil rights.  While they do not 
make structural preemption arguments on state versus federal authority, 
echoes of the shotgun quarantine debates are clearly evident.  Local 
protectionism, allegedly tinged with some political grandstanding, motivated 
the stricter and disproportionate quarantines of a class of travelers.  Medical 
necessity and the use of least restrictive settings for isolation, the standard 
for due process, yielded to other interests.  Similar to the nineteenth-century 
response to yellow fever, the immediacy of a local health threat trumped 
consideration of wider consequences.  In our federal system, state and local 
 
288 Id. at *1. 
289 Id. at *19. 
290 Verified Complaint at 19, Hickox v. Christie, No. 15-7647 (KM), 2016 WL 4744181, (D. 
N.J. Sept. 9, 2016) (No. 2:15-cv07647-KM-JBC). 
291  Id. at 33. 





Dec. 2016] EPIDEMICS, OUTSIDERS, AND LOCAL PROTECTION 425 
 
governments alone determine exigency of protective action, inevitably 
exhibiting a “safety first” bias in favor of their own residents.  Governor 
Christie has already suggested the potential use of quarantine for the Zika 
virus in New Jersey, a move some experts characterize as “pointless.”296 
C. Syrian Refugees, Toxic Waste, and Other Perceived Threats to Local 
Communities 
This local protectionist bias in public health federalism, as exemplified 
by the shotgun quarantine, is not unrelated to modern “home rule” and 
“not in my backyard” ideology.  Other historical examples abound, 
including laws against vagrancy, fugitive slaves and the exclusion of free 
persons of color in the antebellum South, the reaction to Chinese 
immigrants in the late nineteenth century and the Chinese Exclusion Acts.  
Modern manifestations include local objection to resettlement of Syrian 
refugees (from a fear of terrorist infiltration) as well as to toxic waste 
introduced from another state.  The exclusion of perceived threats as a local 
prerogative shares deep roots with the nineteenth-century shotgun 
quarantine.  Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to examine these 
issues in detail, I offer some brief observations.  The lesson is not that the 
Commerce Clause alone provides inherent federal supremacy in heath 
emergencies, as I argue is the case for quarantine.  But local protectionism 
in defiance of a national interest has deep roots with modern resonance. 
Take the controversy over the resettlement of Syrian refugees.  As the 
Syrian refugee crisis unfolded across Europe and the Middle East, a number 
of state governors announced their intention to deny resettlement of Syrians 
in their communities, contrary to a U.S. government plan to receive 10,000 
refugees over the next year.  They cited threats to public safety as 
justification for this extraordinary invocation of the state’s traditional police 
power.297 
Indeed, the State of Texas filed suit in federal court to keep Syrian 
refugees out of the state.  The state claims that federal officials violated the 
Refugee Act of 1980, which requires the federal government to “consult 
regularly” with states prior to resettlement.298  As a state official 
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characterized, “it is about protecting Texans.”299  Along with some other 
states, Texas prefers to seal its borders to refugees, who are lawful U.S 
residents once resettled in any state.  This refusal of initial resettlement 
within the state ignores the fact that the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
implies a right to travel or relocate from another state. 
Then there is the dispute over trash and toxic waste disposal from out-of-
state sources.  Local governments understandably are concerned with 
becoming a dumping ground for waste generated elsewhere.  Here the 
Supreme Court has had much to say, even if the doctrinal underpinnings of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause have been especially troubling.300  Bans on 
out-of-state waste disposal have been generally struck down in the name of 
the Commerce Clause.  In Philadelphia v. New Jersey,301 for example, a state 
statute prohibited the importation of waste from outside the state.  Although 
the stated purpose of the statute was to protect “public health, safety, and 
welfare,” the Supreme Court invalidated the statute because it discriminated 
against out-of-state commercial interests, stating: “What is crucial is the 
attempt by one State to isolate itself from a problem common to many by 
erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade.”302  Justice 
Rehnquist, in dissent, pointed to the Quarantine Cases in justification of such 
state action.303 
What these issues have in common is the urge to defend against outside 
threats through “home rule,” whether it be contagious disease, toxic waste, 
or terrorist infiltration.  These are not inherently bad impulses, of course.  I 
do not suggest we risk a return of the local shotgun quarantine to keep these 
threats out.  Instead, I note them to highlight the ambiguity embedded in a 
state’s right to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of its 
inhabitants, set against a constitutional structure that historically has 
privileged local boundaries in matters of quarantine.  The shotgun 
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quarantine evidenced a much larger but equally complicated issue.  But, as 
Justice Benjamin Cardozo noted in another context, the federal 
Constitution “was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several 
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and 
salvation are in union and not division.”304 
CONCLUSION 
Can the federal government preempt state or local quarantines?  The 
question remains open today.  This Article has examined the legislative 
history of the shotgun quarantine to shed light on an enduring issue with 
modern interest—local protectionism at the expense of national interest. 
Human fear and human reactions affect how law is made and how it is 
enforced.  A “fear factor” played a prominent role in public response to 
Ebola in the United States, as it certainly did with the widespread use of 
geographic quarantine and martial law in Liberia and Sierra Leone.  While 
undeniably catastrophic in parts of western Africa, an Ebola epidemic in the 
U.S.  was extremely unlikely.  Scientists worry more about new viruses that 
easily spread through the air, unlike the transmission of Ebola.305  Such new 
viruses, or mutations of old ones, could have the global reach and 
devastation of the Spanish influenza in 1918.306  In this light, state and local 
demand for independent quarantine authority is easily understood. 
Historically, the shotgun quarantine pressed Congress to provide for 
greater federal control of state and local quarantine.  Although proponents 
did not get all that they wanted from Congress, the advocacy of Southern 
politicians, chambers of commerce, railroads and other business interests 
nearly effected a much greater enlargement of federal government 
authority.  The U.S. Supreme Court invited Congress to extend intrastate 
federal quarantine power by statute, but it has yet to do so. 
Why did legislation authorizing federal intervention in local quarantines 
fail when the need was clearly demonstrated and southern states dropped 
objections to it, and even advocated in its favor?  I have suggested that one 
answer to this question lies in a failure of the political process in a nascent 
era of agency development.  But the shotgun quarantine posed a 
complicated problem because of a long history of exclusive state police 
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power in matters of health, along with a Dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine that was in great disarray. 
The term “shotgun quarantine,” incidentally, continued to be used in 
other contexts in the early decades of the twentieth century.  In 1908, for 
example, the Washington Post applied the term in an article titled “Color 
Line Drawn.”307  In a congressional debate over integration of train cars in 
the District of Columbia, one member described discrimination in the South 
as “a shotgun quarantine established . . . against negroes.”308  The Chicago 
Daily Tribune, tongue in cheek, applied the term to southern politics: 
People must not be misled by the news that all shotgun quarantines in 
the State of Mississippi have been withdrawn.  This applies only so far as 
yellow-fever is concerned.  The old shotgun quarantine against 
Republican voters will be rigidly maintained.309 
The term “shotgun quarantine” is also still defined in some medical 
dictionaries as “[t]he enforcing of a land quarantine by means of soldiers or 
an armed guard.”310 
As I have written elsewhere, the unique brand of public health 
federalism in the United States is an historical relic, surviving various 
moments of strong centralizing forces.311  This Article has considered one of 
the most significant of those moments.  Primary authority in the realm of 
public health still resides in state and local governments, with no significant 
federal presence displacing that authority.  The federal government is still 
limited to a supporting role with respect to public health authority over 
matters such as quarantine.312 
Because Congress never acted to quell the shotgun quarantine, we have 
largely forgotten these legal debates over federal interstate authority.  In 
recovering that history, this Article offers a new perspective on how to 
manage public health crises in our federal system, highlighting the need for 
regulatory standards that could preempt an unnecessary and ill-advised local 
quarantine.  The particulars of any federal oversight of a public health 
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emergency will still pose significant problems.  As a Mississippi judge noted 
more than a century ago, “Pestilence, like war, disrupts society, and silences 
the law.”313  The yellow fever “shotgun quarantine” tested our constitutional 
structure for response to public health emergencies, and found it lacking.  
This “federalism theater” is still evident today. 
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